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SECURITIES LAW
By ALLAN

HORWICH* AND DAVID

S.

RUDER**

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has neither the heaviest nor the lightest securities laws caseload among the eleven Courts
of Appeal. However, it has often been in the forefront in developments involving the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and the Securities
Act of 1933.2 For example, that court's 1963 decision in Kohler v.
Kohler Co.,8 was one of the early appellate cases interpreting Rule
lOb-5 4 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") pursuant to Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,' which has become
the primary federal securities law antifraud provision.'
The Seventh
*
Member, Illinois Bar. A.B. 1966, Princeton University; J.D. 1969, University
of Chicago.
** Professor of Law, Northwestern University. Member, Illinois and Wisconsin
Bars. B.A. 1951, Williams College; J.D. 1957, University of Wisconsin.
NOTE: The authors are involved in two cases discussed herein which have been remanded to the district court for further proceedings. In the discussion of those cases
there is no analysis of unresolved issues. This article bears a date of August 15, 1973,
except as to action of the United States Supreme Court through October 22, 1973.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (1971) (hereinafter referred to as the 1934 Act).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1971) (hereinafter referred to as the 1933 Act).
3. 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963) (Opinion by Judge Swygert joined by Judges
Schnackenberg and Castle). The titles of the judges referred to herein are as of the
dates of the respective opinions.
4. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1971).
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b)
To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1971).
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange-

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
6. The Kohler case is still cited frequently. Recent citations to Kohler induce
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Circuit has also decided Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance
Co.,7 the leading case finding liability under Rule lOb-5 for aiding and
abetting. The two decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with civil
liability for a violation of the federal proxy rules8 reached that Court on
writs of certiorari to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. J.1. Case Co.
v. Borak,9 and Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. 10
The primary purpose of this article is to describe and analyze
the work of the Seventh Circuit in the securities law field during the past
year. In the period covered by this article the Seventh Circuit faced numerous difficult and novel problems in these areas. Topics to be discussed will include the definition of security, standing to sue, the
scope of liability, secondary liability, conflict of interest in corporate
mergers and liquidations, violation of rules of self-regulatory organizations, statutes of limitations, and short-swing profit liability. In order
to place the court's recent decisions in context, comparison will be
made to developments in other circuits and to past Seventh Circuit decisions. Since in some cases the court's analysis has been less than
complete or precise, one goal of this article is to note those questions
which require further analysis. On the whole, however, the decisions
discussed demonstrate that the Seventh Circuit continues to make
Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 353 F. Supp. 795, 799 n.16, 800 n.18. (W.D. Pa.
1973); Cash v. Frederick & Co., 57 F.R.D. 71, 75 (E.D. Wis. 1972); and Taylor v.
Smith, Barney & Co., 358 F. Supp. 892, 895 (D. Utah .1973).
7. 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (Opinion
by Judge Swygert joined by Judge Cummings; Judge Morgan of the Southern District
of Illinois dissenting), af'g 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968) (on the merits),
259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (on motion to dismiss) (Judge Eschbach).
8. Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9 (1971), promulgated by the SEC pursuant

to Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1971), which provides:
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of
any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the
light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading
with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact
necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading or

necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with respect
to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which
has become false or misleading.

(b) The fact that a proxy statement, form of proxy or other soliciting
material has .been filed with or examined by the Commission shall not be
deemed a finding by the Commission that such material is accurate or complete or not false or misleading, or that the Commission has passed upon the
merits of or approved any statement contained therein or any matter to be
acted upon by security holders.
shall be made.

No representation contrary to the foregoing

9. 377 U.S. 426 (1964), affg Borak v. J.I. Case Co., 317 F.2d 838 (7th Cir.
1963) (Opinion by Chief Judge Mercer of the Southern District of Illinois joined by
Judges Duffy and Kiley).

10. 396 U.S. 375 (1970), rev'g 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968) (Opinion by Judge
Fairchild joined by Judges Swygert and Kerner).
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thoughtful and significant contributions to the development of the
federal securities laws.
DEFINITION OF SECURITY

In many securities law cases a threshold question is whether the
plaintiff in fact purchased or sold a "security," as that term is defined
in the applicable statute. On two recent occasions the court addressed
itself to that question.
In Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc." plaintiffs deposited funds
with defendant Nelson, an agent for M-S Commodities, Inc., a broker
in commodities futures. Nelson was to use the money in his discretion
to trade commodities futures on margin on behalf of the plaintiffs.
Nelson's trading resulted in a deficit in plaintiffs' account. In response to Nelson's demand for additional funds, plaintiffs asked for
the return of their original investment, contending that the agreement
with Nelson constituted the sale of a "security," without registration under Section 5 of the 1933 Act. Under Section 12 (1) of that Act a
unless the transaction
buyer can rescind his purchase of a security
12
was registered or exempt from registration.
In the Court of Appeals plaintiffs' suit under Section 12 (1)
against M-S Commodities, Inc. and Nelson centered around the question whether the discretionary commodities trading account constituted
a security within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act. The
District Court" granted defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground
that the transaction between plaintiffs and defendants was an exempt
offering. 4 It therefore did not reach the definitional issue. Although
a commodities futures contract is not expressly included within the
definition in Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, that broad definition includes "any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of
indebtedness . . . . investment contract, . . . or, in general, any inThe most
terest or instrument commonly known as a security."'"
11. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972) (Opinion
by Judge Stevens joined by Senior Judge Duffy; Judge Kerner heard oral argument but
did not participate in the adoption of the opinion).
12. Regarding these requirements generally see Ruder, Federal Restrictions on the
Resale of Securities, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. (Supp.) 1 (1972).
13. 320 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. I1. 1970) (Judge Will).
14. Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1971):
The provisions of section 5 of this title shall not apply to(2)

transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.

15. 15 U.S.C. § 77a(1) (1971).
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liberally interpreted phrase in the definition is "investment contract."
In an early leading case, S.E.C. v. W. J. Howey Co.,16 the Supreme
Court interpreted that phrase by holding that:
the test [of inclusion] is whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common1 7 enterprise with profits to come
solely from the efforts of others.
Recent applications of the Howey test have expanded the meaning of
the portion of the investment contract test referring to "profits to come
solely from the efforts of others" to include situations in which the
investor participates in a limited degree in the enterprise.' 8
In Milnarik the Seventh Circuit concentrated on the "common enterprise" portion of the definition. 19 The court recognized that an investment contract could be created by an agreement providing (a)
that all commodities trading would be done by the defendant at the
sole risk of the plaintiff and (b) that defendant's profit would be
solely from commissions. 2" However, it stated that not "every conceivable arrangement that would fit a dictionary definition of an investment contract was intended to be included within the statutory
definition of a security."'" Emphasizing the "economic reality," the
court held that no common enterprise was involved in Nelson's discretionary control over plaintiffs' commodities account. Although plaintiffs alleged that Nelson had entered into similar agreements with others,
the court held that the success or failure of any one agreement had no
impact on any other, stating that Nelson's customers "were not joint
participants in the same investment enterprise, '2 2 as is the case with
the typical investment contract.23 The court treated investment contracts as involving creation of a pool of capital by the defendant with
the common enterprise, supported by that capital, divided into individ16.

328 U.S. 293 (1946).

17. 328 U.S. at 301.
18. E.g. SECURITIES ACT RELEASE No. 5211 (Nov. 30, 1971); State v. Hawaii
Market Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (Hawaii 1971). See note 29 infra.
19. 457 F.2d at 276-79.
20. 457 F.2d at 275 n.3, citing Maheu v. Reynolds Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.
N.Y. 1968), and Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
21. 457 F.2d at 275-76.
22. 457 F.2d at 277. Query, whether the court's holding would have been different had Nelson used the discretionary authority granted by the several customers to
purchase the same commodities for each investor as an investment pool. See Anderson
v. Francis I. du Pont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705, 708 (D. Minn. 1968). In Milnarik
plaintiffs did not so allege. 320 F. Supp. at 1152.
23. E.g., S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., supra note 16 (investment in citrus groves and
optional' contracts therefore); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967), rev'g
371 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1967) (Opinion by Judge Knoch joined by Judge Kiley;
Judge Cummings dissenting) (withdrawable capital share of Illinois savings and loan
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ual units allocated to the various purchasers. 24 It quoted with approval the District Court's conclusion that when plaintiffs gave their
money to Nelson nothing had been sold. Agreeing that only a simple
transfer of funds to an agent was involved,2 5 the court concluded:
We do not believe an investor who grants discretionary authority to his broker thereby joins the broker's other customers
in the kind of common enterprise 2that
would convert the agency
6
relationship into a statutory security.
In reaching its conclusion the court in Milnarik did not deal directly with two district court cases cited by it which had held that a discretionary futures account is a security. Both Maheu v. Reynolds &
Co.2 7 and Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc.28 relied on Howey in determining that a discretionary commodities account is an investment
contract. 29 The District Court in Maheu rejected the contention that
a common enterprise is required, holding that:
The joint account may constitute a security even if there 30
was no
pooling arrangement or common enterprise among investors.
The court in Maheu relied in part on the fact that in Howey each purchaser's profit or loss was based on the success or failure of the tract
assigned to him and not of the common enterprise. 31 Without indicating that it was replying to Maheu, the Seventh Circuit stated that the
individual aspect in Howey "did not obscure the economic reality of
participation in a common enterprise. ' 32 In Howey the purchaser had
no right to specific fruit grown on his tract of the grove, all produce
association is a security, either as an investment contract (emphasizing common enterprise element at 389 U.S. at 338), participation in profit-sharing agreement, stock or

transferable share); Kemmerer v. Weaver, 445 F.2d 76 (7th Cir. 1971) (Opinion by
Senior Judge Duffy joined by Judges Cummings and Kerner) (investment in contracts
for purchase, raising and selling of beavers). See generally Annot., "What is an
'Investment Contract' within the Meaning of § 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933
(15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)), Defining the Term 'Security' as Including an Investment Contract," 3 ALR Fed. 592 (1970).
24. Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 278, quoting 320 F. Supp. at 1152.

25. 320 F. Supp. at 1151, quoted at 457 F.2d at 277.
26. 457 F.2d at 279.
27. Supra note 20, 282 F. Supp. at 426, 429.
28. Supra note 20, 291 F. Supp. at 702.
29. Supra note 18. Also see Johnson v. Arthur Espey, Shearson, Hammill & Co.,

341 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (a discretionary commodities account is an investment contract) and Commercial Iron & Metal Co. v. Bache & Co., 478 F.2d 39
(10th Cir. 1973) (a discretionary commodities account may be an investment contract).
Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972),
specifically followed Milnarik and refused to follow Maheu and Berman.
30. 282 F. Supp. at 429.
31. 282 F. Supp. at 429, quoting S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 151 F.2d 714, 715-

16 n.5 and 717 (5th Cir. 1945).
32. 457 F.2d at 279 (footnote omitted).
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grown on all tracts was pooled for sale, and the entire enterprise depended for its success on the existence of the facilities and manpower
of the common enterprise."3
The common enterprise analysis used by the Seventh Circuit thus
seems to indicate that no investment contract can exist unless there is
an element of commonality between the plaintiffs discretionary commodities account and similar accounts of others. Use of the "common
enterprise" language of Howey in this manner seems to be an unfortunately literal approach to the Supreme Court's liberal language.34
Further, the result in Milnarik seems far more conservative than
that reached in a second recent case involving a definition of "security", Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc.35 In Sanders, the plaintiff, an individual, purchased ninety-day maturity commercial paper
from John Nuveen & Co., Inc., a commercial paper dealer. After the
issuer of the paper announced that it would not pay the debt when it
matured the plaintiff brought a class action against the broker-dealer
and others alleging, inter alia, that they had violated Rule 1Ob-5 in connection with the class members' purchases of the issuer's commercial
paper. The defendants claimed that the complaint did not state a
cause of action under the 1934 Act because that Act excluded commercial paper from the definition of "security." The District Court denied the motion.3 6
Section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act3 7 defines "security," in pertinent part, to include "any note" but excludes ". . . any note . . .
33. 457 F.2d at 279 n.7, quoting Howey, supra note 16, 328 U.S. at 296, 300.
34. The Howey test, text accompanying note 17 supra, is not always strictly construed. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that, despite the use
of the word "solely" in Howey, an investment contract may be found where the
efforts of those other than the investor are "the undeniably significant ones, those
essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise."
S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3194 (1973).
35. 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972) (Opinion
by Judge Sprecher joined by Judge Kiley and Senior Judge Hastings). The petition for
certiorari, respondent's brief in opposition and petitioners' reply thereto are reprinted
in full at B.N.A. SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 169 at G-1; id. No. 173 at D-1; and id.
No. 174 at D-1, respectively.
36. Unreported decision (N.D. Ill. 1970) (Judge Perry).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1971).
(a) When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requiresThe term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
(10)
debenture, certificate of interest or participator in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security,
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which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine
months . . . . " Defendants contended that since the commercial paper was a note with a maturity of only ninety days, it was not a
security.
The plaintiff argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the
definition of security in the 1934 Act should be read in light of provisions in the 1933 Act. Under the latter Act all notes are securities"8
and Section 3 (a) (3) 39-40 exempts:
Any note . . .which arises out of a current transaction or the

proceeds of which have been or are to be used for current transactions, and which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not
exceeding nine months ....
In applying the 1933 Act provisions the court relied upon an SEC
release stating that the nine months clause:
applies only to prime quality negotiable commercial paper of a
type not ordinarily purchased by the general public, that is, paper
issued to facilitate well recognized types of current operational
of a type eligible for discounting by
business requirements and
41
Federal Reserve Banks.

It read the SEC interpretation as embodying four conjunctive tests for
exclusion from the 1934 Act. The court reasoned that since the issuer
declared insolvency within a month after plaintiff's purchase
it seems highly unlikely that the paper purchased by the plaintiff
and members of his class is either prime quality or issued to
or eligible for discounting by Fedfacilitate current transactions
42
eral Reserve Banks.
or in general, any instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for,
receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or punchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or
banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace or any renewal thereof the
maturity of which is likewise limited.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1971).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1971).
(a) Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any of the following classes of securities:
(3) Any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which arises
out of a current transaction or the proceeds of which have been or are to be
used for current transactions, and which has a maturity at the time of issuance
of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal
thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited . .

.

.

40. The exemptions are expressly made inapplicable to the "antifraud" provisions
of the 1933 Act, Sections 12(2) and 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2) and 77q(a), respectively. See Sections 12(2) and 17(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(c) (1971).
41. SECUUnEs AcT REL. No. 4412 (1961), 17 CFR 231.4412, quoted at 463
F.2d at 1079.
42. 463 F.2d at 1079.
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It also concluded that since 42 persons were in the alleged class, "The
paper was therefore obviously offered and sold to the general public
... .,43 Therefore, "The notes fail to meet any of the S.E.C.'s four
requirements for exemption. 4 4
In departing from the plain meaning of Section 3(a)(10) 41 the
court noted that among the six major federal securities laws46 only
the 1934 Act excludes some notes from the entire statute.
Since the same note is subject to the antifraud provisions of all
the other securities acts, it becomes important to determine just
intended to be exempt from the operation of the
what Congress
47
1934 act.

It concluded:
[I]t is reasonably clear that plaintiff and his class purchased the
kind of "security" in regard to which the securities acts were intended to offer protection against fraud, misrepresentation and
non-disclosure. Five of those acts expressly did so. We believe
Congress intended to protect against fraud the purchasers of se48
curities such as those involved here under the 1934 Act as well.
In essence, the court was saying that the literal reading of Section 3 (a)
(10) should be disregarded in order to fulfill the Congressional policy
expressed more broadly in the other statutes of protecting investors
from fraud. It looked to Section 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act for some
guidance. This approach could be justified through reliance on the introductory statement in Section 3(a) of the 1934 Act which provides
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Early in the opinion the court observed, without qualification, that "[O]nly
in the 1934 Act is a note with a maturity not exceeding nine months withdrawn from
the application of the antifraud provisions of the act, section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5."
463 F.2d at 1078.
46. In addition to the 1933 and 1934 Acts they are the Investment Company Act
of 1940 ("Investment Company Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et seq. (1971), the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 et seq. (1971), Trust Indenture Act
of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1971), and Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a et seq. (1971).
47. 463 F.2d at 1078. It would have been as logical to conclude from the comparison of the statutes that the exclusion of all short-term notes from the entire 1934
Act was intentional. The congressional hearings and debates on the 1934 Act are
silent on the scope of the exclusion. The legislative history may suggest that the
difference in pattern between the 1934 Act and 1933 Act was intentional. Comment,
The Commercial Paper Market and the Securities Atts, 39 U. CH. L. REV. 362,
398 (1972).
48. 463 F.2d at 1079-80 (footnotes omitted). The court could have reached
that conclusion without any reference to Section 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act since even
notes which are exempt from registration under that section are within the scope of
the 1933 Act antifraud provisions. See note 40 supra. The entire discussion of Section
3(a) (3) would thus appear to be dictum.
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that the stated definitions shall apply "unless the context otherwise requires. '' 4 Had the Court expressly relied on this rationale it could
have avoided the excursion into interpretation of Section 3(a)(3) of the
1933 Act. 50
The Court also stated that commercial paper, at least when purchased by individuals as contrasted with financial institutions, is probably also an investment contract. 51
[A] person who seeks to invest his money and receives a note in
return for it has not purchased commercial paper in the usual
sense. He has purchased a security investment.
It seems likely that the arrangements between Nuveen and
plaintiff constituted "the placing of capital or laying out of money
in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment." [Citing S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298
1946.152

The court's off-hand statement that the commercial paper constituted
an investment contract stands in sharp contrast to its holding in Milnarik
that a discretionary commodities account is not an investment contract.
Perhaps the apparent difference in result can be ascribed to the transactional framework of each case. In Milnarik the plaintiff claimed a
violation of the registration provisions of the 1933 Act under circumstances in which a favorable ruling would have placed the entire risk
of loss on the broker-dealer. In Sanders the underlying claim was
violation of antifraud provisions. The results in Milnarik and Sanders
might have been opposite had Milnarik been based upon an antifraud
claim and Sanders based upon failure to register under the 1933 Act.
The holding of the court in Sanders came as something of a surprise to the commercial paper industry,53 although not to at least one
commentator. 54 Nevertheless, even after the Sanders decision the SEC
has maintained its position that commercial paper with a maturity of
not more than nine months may not be a 1934 Act security and may
also be exempt from 1933 Act registration requirements. 5 However,
in a somewhat different context the Second Circuit has found that both
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) .(1971). The same statement appears in Section 2 of
the 1933 Act.
50. Also see note 48 supra.
51. 463 F.2d at 1080. This analysis was labeled dictum by the court. 463 F.2d
at 1080-81.
52. 463 F.2d at 1080.
53. Wall Street Journal, Midwest Edition, Nov. 14, 1972, at 2.
54. Comment, The Commercial Paper Market and the Securities Acts, 39 U.

Cm. L. REv. 362, 400 (1972).
55. The Financial Collapse of the Penn Central Company,
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 274 (1972).
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the holding and reasoning of Sanders are correct. 50
Whether or not the results in Milnarik and Sanders are correct, it
is important to note that in both cases the Seventh Circuit strove to follow the Supreme Court's admonition in Tcherepnin v. Knight17 that
form should be disregarded for substance in determining whether a
a given instrument or agreement constitutes a security. While in both
cases the court began by recognizing that a literal reading of the
applicable statute led to one result,58 the court's analysis in each case
led to the opposite conclusion. The lack of certainty which prevails
in this area of the law can be expected to continue.
STANDING TO SUE AND THE SCOPE OF CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER
THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS

The greatest source of litigation under the federal securities laws
is Rule lOb-5,5 9 dealing with deceptive and manipulative conduct in
connection with the purchase and sale of a security. The ingenuity of
counsel in framing complaints to state a cause of action under that
rule, and thereby proceed in federal court, 60 may be unmatched in the
56. Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Co., 476 F.2d 795, 799-800 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (1973).
57. Supra note 23.
58. Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 275; Sanders, 463 F.2d at 1078.
59. The rule was promulgated by the Commission in 1942 pursuant to authority
granted by Sections 23(a) and 10 of the 1934 Act. See notes 4 and 5, supra.
60. Section 27 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78a(a), provides that the federal
courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over actions predicated on violations of the 1934
Act or the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder:
The district courts of the United States, and the United States courts of
any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and
regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought
to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder. Any criminal proceeding may be brought in the district
wherein any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred. Any suit
or action to enforce any liability or-duty created by this chapter or rules and
regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such chapter or rules
and regulations, may be brought in any such district or in the district wherein
the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process
in such cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an
inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found. Judgments and decrees
so rendered shall be subject to review as provided in sections 225 and 347 of
Title 28. No costs shall be assessed for or against the Commission in any
proceeding under this chapter brought by or against it in the Supreme Court
or such other courts.
Caution in reading this section too narrowly stems from cases such as Aetna State
Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970) holding that although federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over complaints filed under Rule lOb-5, a state court can
consider questions under Rule lOb-5 raised as defensive matters. (Opinion by Judge
Pell joined by Chief Judge Swygert and by Judge Doyle of the Western District of
Wisconsin).
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annals of legal history. Despite the volume of litigation, however,
many important questions remain unanswered,"' and some significant
questions have been answered differently by different federal appellate
courts. 62

These problems stem in large part from the fact that since

private civil liability under Rule 10b-5 is implied, the elements thereof
are primarily judge-made. 8

In order to have standing to sue for damages under Rule lOb-5, a
plaintiff must have been a purchaser or seller of a security in connection
with the violation of the rule.6 4 The simplest claim under Rule
1Ob-5 recites a violation of the second clause of the rule, which renders

it unlawful
to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of6 5the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading.

A typical Rule lOb-5 case under this subsection will involve a knowing
misrepresentation of facts pertaining to the value of a security upon
61. The Supreme Court has decided only three cases dealing directly with Rule
lOb-5. S.E.C. v. Nat'l Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (a merger is a sale
for purposes of Rule 10-b); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,
404 U.S. 6 (1971). (Standing to sue based on conversion of proceeds following sale of
securities); and Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128- (1972) (fraudulent nondisclosure in connection with purchase of securities).
62. For example, to establish liability under Rule 10b-5 in the Second Circuit a
plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct involved scienter. Shemtob v. ShearThe Ninth Circuit,
son, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971).
among others, has indicated that negligence may be sufficient. Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d
270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961). This particular difference, which is not limited to the
Second and Ninth Circuits, may affect the selection of the statute of limitations applicable to an action under Rule lob-5. See text accompanying note 260 et seq. infra.
63. Neither Rule lOb-5 nor Section 10(b) expressly provides for private actions
for damages or equitable relief. A complete discussion of the elements of a cause of
action under Rule lOb-5 and the unresolved questions under the rule is beyond the
scope of this article. The reader should therefore consult the basic texts such as
BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW:

FRAUD (1971);

3 Loss, SEcuRmIEs REGULATION 1448

et seq., 1763 et seq. (2d ed. 1961); and 6 Loss, SECUrITEs REGULATION 3558 et seq.,
3869 et seq. (1969 Supp.). Recent commentary by or under the supervision of one of
the authors includes: Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases:
Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Par! Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597 (1972) (hereafter Ruder, Multiple Defendants); Bucklo,
Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 562 (1972); Ruder and Cross, Limitations on Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1125 (1972); Ruder,
Current Developments in the Federal Law of Corporate Fiduciary Relations-Standing
to Sue under Rule 10b-5, 26 Bus. LAw. 1289 (1971).
64. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). See Ruder, Current Developments in the Federal
Law of Corporate Fiduciary Relations--Standing to Sue under Rule lob-5, 26 Bus.
LAw. 1289, 1292 et seq. (1971).
65. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5(2) (1971).
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which the plaintiff relies in purchasing the security. However, many
different types of conduct, including total nondisclosure, 66 have been
held unlawful under the other clauses of Rule 10b-5, which prohibit
any scheme to defraud or any course of business which operates as a
fraud6 7 in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.
Jannes v. Microwave Communications, Inc.6s came to the Court
of Appeals after many procedural maneuvers in the District Court. 69
Plaintiffs, stockholders of Microwave Communications, Inc. ("MCI")
suing derivatively under Rule 1Ob-5, complained of two transactions:
(1) MCI's sale of some of its assets to a second corporation for stock
of the buyer alleged to be inadequate in value; and (2) the sale by
MCI of its own stock to a defendant for inadequate consideration. The
first transaction was allegedly approved by the MCI board of directors
based upon misrepresentations made by certain defendant-board members as to the necessity for the sale. The individual defendants were
some of the officers and directors of MCI and the controlling shareholder of the purchaser of MCI assets.7"
The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground, inter
alia, that since plaintiffs had alleged only corporate mismanagement
and breach of fiduciary duty no claim was stated under Rule 10b-5. 71'
The District Court also relied on its interpretation that the transactions
complained of did not involve fraud or deceit in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security. 72 These principles were restated by the
Seventh Circuit in an opinion reversing the lower court:
66. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
See note 214 infra.
67. E.g. Cochran v. Canning Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). (Defendants caused corporation to pass a dividend, enabling defendants to buy the stock at
depressed price on open market; plaintiff was open-market seller); A.T. Brod & Co. v.
Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1968). (Customer purchased stock through plaintiffbroker with intent to pay only if the security increased in price); Vine v. Beneficial
Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
(Larger company-defendant engaged in scheme with officers of smaller company to
buy most of the stock of the smaller company, of which plaintiff was shareholder,
facilitating short-term merger and giving plaintiff no option but to accept the appraisal
value for his stock.) Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D.
Ga. 1972) (Formation of new corporation by all but one stockholder of old corporation in order to freeze out remaining stockholder); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430
F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). (Churning of customer's account by broker).
68. 461 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1972). (Opinion by Judge Sprecher joined by Judges
Kiley and Pell).
69. 325 F. Supp. 896 (N.D. I11. 1971), 325 F. Supp. 898 (N.D. IM. 1971) (Chief
Judge Robson), described at 461 F.2d at 526-28.
70. 461 F.2d at 527.
71. 325 F. Supp. 898, 901.
72. 325 F. Supp. 898, 901.
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The relatively short opinion by Judge Augustus Hand [in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.73] established two durable principles interpreting the last crucial phrase of Rule lOb-5, "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." The first, a
procedural guideline, was a standing-to-sue requirement that only
defrauded purchasers or sellers could bring suit under the rule.
The second, which went to the substantive basis for stating a claim
for federal relief, was that section 10(b) and the rule were "directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities
74
rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs.
The Court of Appeals relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 7n which
had been decided after the rulings by the District Court. "In that case
the Supreme Court held that the Superintendent of Insurance of New
York State, as liquidator of Manhattan Casualty Co., had standing
based upon a claim that the defendants caused Manhattan to sell
bonds and misappropriated the proceeds. The Supreme Court rejected
a claim that the transaction was simply fraudulent mismanagement of
corporate affairs.7 6
In Jannes the Seventh Circuit held that under the facts as alleged
MCI suffered injury cognizable under Rule 1Ob-5 "as a result of deceptive practices touching its purchase of securities" when it received
only 25 percent of the buyer's stock for MCI assets, and that a claim
was stated for the issuance of shares to controlling shareholders for
inadequate consideration. 77 Although the Seventh Circuit treated
Jannes as involving novel questions controlled by the recent Bankers
Life decision, the case did not present a departure from clear trends
in the law under Rule lOb-5. Prior decisions had consistently held
that the corporate purchase of securities for excessive consideration
where the buyer was deceived states a claim under Rule 1Ob-5 .78
73. Supra note 64.
74. 461 F.2d at 528 (citations omitted).
75. 404 U.S. 6 (1971), rev'g 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'g 300 F. Supp.
1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
76. The transaction described in the text was only one of several transactions
complained of. See 430 F.2d 355, 358 (2d Cir. 1970). The other transactions presented more difficult questions under Rule 10b-5, but the Supreme Court did not
reach them. "We hold only that the alleged fraud is cognizable under § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 in the bond sale and we express no opinion as to Manhattan's standing
under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 on other phases of the complaint." 404 U.S. at 13 n.10.
For a recent analysis of Bankers Life, see Note, Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life: Through the Looking Glass, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 930 (1973).
77. 461 F.2d at 529.
78. Jordan Building Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., 401 F.2d 47 (7th Cir.
1968) (Opinion by Judge Schnackenberg joined by Chief Judge Castle and Judge
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Likewise many courts, including the Seventh Circuit, had recognized the validity of a claim that directors violate Rule 1Ob-5 by de-

ceiving other directors into voting for or consummating securities
transactions involving conflicts of interest. 79 The Court of Appeals
itself cited established authority to support the second claim. 0 In
short, Jannes was decided in accordance with the clear trend of case

law under Rule lOb-5 and its facts did not present the unique case the
Court of Appeals suggested. 8

A second recent standing case decided by the Seventh Circuit,
Mintz v. Mathers Fund, Inc., 2 involved the right to sue under Section

12(1) of the 1933 Act.

Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf

of all persons who purchased stock of the Mathers Fund, Inc. (the
"Fund") between March 18 and April 2, 1969, alleging failure to comply with 1933 Act registration requirements. On February 24, 1969

plaintiffs had purchased 37 shares of the Fund.

Their complaint in-

volved an additional 15 shares which they purchased on March 19. On

April 28 plaintiffs redeemed 15 of their shares, which were handled
in accordance with the Fund's usual practice of matching redeemed
shares with blocks of shares purchased in like number, absent contrary
instructions from the shareholder. The redemption resulted in a small

profit.

Plaintiffs, however, assumed that the 15 shares redeemed

8
were from the first 37 shares purchased.

3

Kerner); Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903
(1969). See Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961), cited in Jannes, 461 F.2d at 529 n.2.
79. Dasho v. The Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 270 (7th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 997 (1967).
(Opinion by Judge Schnackenberg; Judge Fairchild
joined by Judge Cummings, concurring) ("Dasho-") (The citation is to the "concurring" opinion); Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir. 1970); Bailes v.
Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241, 1245 (5th Cir. 1971). This point had been revisited by the court in Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972) ("Dasho-I") (opinion by Judge Stevens joined by
Judges Fairchild and Cummings), decided on January 18, 1972, more than a month
before Jannes was argued. However, neither Dasho-I nor Dasho-II was cited in Jannes. For an extensive discussion of the concepts of deception by directors and exertion
of a controlling influence to the detriment of the corporation in a securities transaction,
see Note, The ControllingInfluence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanagement
Cases, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1007 (1973).
80. Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964), and Schoenbaum
v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), cited at
461 F.2d at 529.
81. 461 F.2d at 529-30. For proceedings on remand, see 57 F.R.D. 18 (N.D.
Ill. 1972) (Chief Judge Robson).
82. 463 F.2d 495 (7th Cir. 1972). (Opinion by Judge Juergens of the Eastern
District of Illinois joined by Senior Judge Duffy and by Senior Judge Murrah of the
Tenth Circuit).
83. 463 F.2d at 497-98.
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The District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants
on the ground that since plaintiffs' claim related to their second purchase
and since they had sold those shares through the redemption transaction
plaintiffs had no standing to sue. 4 The Seventh Circuit affirmed on
that ground. 5 Since plaintiffs had no standing to sue for themselves,
they had no standing to maintain the class action, "they not being
similarly situated with other members of the class which they allegedly
sought to represent."8 6 Although the court treated the case as presenting
a standing question, it might also have disposed of the purported class
representatives' claim on the ground that no remedy would be available.
The remedies available for a cause of action under Section 12(1) of the
1933 Act are rescission or damages. 8 7 Since plaintiffs no longer
owned the stock on which their claim was based they could not rescind
and since they made a profit there were no damages suffered by reason of having bought unregistered stock.""
In addition to establishing that the transaction at issue involved
a "security" and that he has standing to sue, the securities law plaintiff
must prove other elements of a cause of action. 9 Since the beginning
of 1972 the Court of Appeals has rendered three opinions involving the
liability of a primary wrongdoer.90 Discussion of two of those cases
will be postponed until the portion of this article pertaining to civil
liability for a misleading proxy statement. 91 In the third case, Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Company, Inc.,9 2 which will not be discussed in detail, the court affirmed a directed verdict for defendants
at the close of the plaintiffs' evidence on the ground that plaintiffs had
failed to prove the statements in question were materially misleading.9 3

1970) (Judge Lynch).
84. Unreported decision (N.D. Ill.
85. 463 F.2d at 498. The court did not state whether the mere fact of resale
deprived plaintiffs of standing or whether the pivotal factor was redemption-resale to
the seller. Query whether plaintiffs would have had standing in this context if their
redemption had been at a loss. See text accompanying note 87 infra.
86. 463 F.2d at 498.
87. Section 12 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1971).
88. Disposition on that ground would not have been for the narrow ground of
lack of standing per se but rather for the broader failure to state a claim.
89. See text accompanying notes 63-67, supra.
90. For cases dealing with secondary liability under the federal securities laws,
see text accompanying notes 94 et seq. infra.
91. See text accompanying notes 151 et seq. infra.
92. 471 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1973) (opinion by Senior Judge Hastings joined by
Judge Cummings and by Judge Gordon of the Eastern District of Wisconsin), af'g
unreported decision (N.D. IM. 1971) (Judge Lynch).
93. 471 F.2d at 822.
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SECONDARY LIABILITY UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS

"Secondary liability" as that term is used in this article means liability which results from another's violation of the federal securities
laws. The 1933 and 1934 Acts explicitly provide for liability for persons who control one who is himself liable, with specific affirmative
defenses.94 Liability for aiding and abetting another's violation is a judicially created form of secondary liability. 5
Although relied on in some early Rule 10b-5 cases brought by the
SEC,9" aiding and abetting did not achieve widespread acceptance in
private actions under Rule 10b-5 until the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co. 9 7 The opinion established that a person who aids and abets a primary wrongdoer in the
latter's violation of Rule 10b-5 is equally liable to the plaintiff, but it
left unanswered many basic questions pertaining to the scope of aiding
and abetting liability. Unfortunately, the court's recent opinions in
this area have not provided answers.
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. First Securities Company of Chicago98 fifteen persons appealed from the disallowance of
their claims against First Securities Company of Chicago ("First Securities"), a broker-dealer firm, predicated on the alleged liability of the
firm for violations of Rule 10b-5 by its president and 92% stockholder,
Leston B. Nay. Nay had induced the claimants to invest funds in a fictitious "escrow" promising to pay them 9% to 12% per year. Nay
appropriated the funds for his own use and finally committed suicide. 99
The escrow transactions were not conducted through First Securities
but some of the contacts between Nay and the claimants took place
on the premises of First Securities and correspondence pertaining to the
94. Section 15 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1971); Section 20(a) of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1971).
95. E.g. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969),
For a comprehensive discussion of aiding and abetcert denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
ting in federal securities law cases, see Ruder, Multiple Defendants at 620 et seq.
96. Timetrust, Inc. v. S.E.C., 142 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1944); In re Burley & Co.,
23 S.E.C. 461 (1946); S.E.C. v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
See additional cases cited in Ruder, Multiple Defendants, at 625-26 n.124.
97. Supra note 7.
98. 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972) ("First Securities-I").
(Opinion by Chief Judge Swygert joined by Senior Judge Hastings and
Judge Sprecher).
99. It was assumed by the court of appeals and all parties that Nay had violated
Rule lOb-5. 463 F.2d at 986. Presumably the security involved was either the notes
and written evidences of indebtedness given to the claimants by Nay or investment

contracts, whether or not evidenced by a writing. 463 F.2d at 984.
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escrow was often on First Securities' letterhead. In receivership proceedings following Nay's death the District Court denied the escrow investors' claims against the firm. 100 The Court of Appeals reversed, find-

ing that the claims against First Securities were sustainable on any of
four separate grounds. 1

1

Although Nay had no actual authority from First Securities to conduct the escrow, the firm was held liable to the claimants on the theory

of apparent authority, 0 2 since Nay, an officer of First Securities, had
used the facilities and stationery of First Securities in carrying out the
swindle.
The court also found First Securities liable to claimants on three
separate theories under the 1934 Act.' 03 The first theory was that Nay

had violated Rule lOb-5 and First Securities was a controlling person
of Nay's under Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act, 04 since Nay was its
employee-president. 66 Since as a 92% owner Nay clearly controlled
First Securities, 0 6 and on the other hand, as president he was technically controlled by First Securities, the result is reasonable. The
100. Unreported decision (N.D. Il. 1970) (Judge Hoffman).
101. 463 F.2d at 985-88.
102. 463 F.2d at 985-86, following REsTATEmNT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 26162 (1958).
103. Two theories are discussed immediately following. The third, violation of a
rule of a self-regulatory securities association, is discussed in the text accompanying
notes 223 et seq. infra.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1971)
(a) Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable
under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder
shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such
controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
105. 463 F.2d 987, citing Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane,
85 F. Supp. 104, 122-23 (W.D. Ark. 1949), where the defendant firm was found to
have controlled a wire correspondent firm. It has been held that liability of an employer for conduct of its employee need not be limited to the control person provisions of the securities acts, but can also extend to common law concepts so that the
employer cannot escape liability under the affirmative defenses for controlling persons
contained in the 1933 and 1934 Acts. John Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F.
Supp. 1165, 1210-13 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970).
However, other cases have simply applied statutory controlling person language in
the employer-employee situation: Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 443
N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970) (liability of broker for acts of employee, under Section 20); Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F.
Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (liability of broker for acts of employee, under Section 20); Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 460-61 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (leaving
open the possibility of liability of a broker for acts of its employee under Section 20).
106. See Whittaker v. Wall, 226 F.2d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 1955) (president and
large stockholder held controlling person under Section 15 of the 1933 Act); Schillner
v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co., 134 F.2d 875, 879 (2d Cir. 1943) (sole shareholder held
controlling person under Section 15).
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form of ownership and control should not permit liability for fraud to
be avoided in situations involving virtual identity of interests.
Under Section 20, once the liability of the controlled person and
the defendant's controlling person status have been established, the
burden shifts to the defendant to prove the affirmative defense that it
acted in good faith and did not induce the acts constituting the violation by the controlled person. Apparently reading those elements as
conjunctive, the court held First Securities failed to establish the deOther personnel of First
fense, since it did not act in good faith.'
Securities had enforced a rule imposed by Nay which prohibited anyone from opening mail addressed to him or to his attention, even when
he was away.'0 8 This rule at least facilitated concealment of the escrow
from other employees.
The most important (and poorly considered) holding of the
First Securities decision was based upon aiding and abetting doctrine.
In Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.' 9 the court
had upheld a complaint charging Merrill Lynch with aiding and abetting a fraud by another broker, Dobich. Merrill Lynch allegedly knew
that Dobich was wrongfully converting his own customer's securities
and using the proceeds to trade for his own account through Merrill
Lynch. 110 In Brennan"' the court sustained a judgment against a
corporation for aiding and abetting the same broker's violation of
Rule 1Ob-5. In that case Dobich's fraud consisted of making late
deliveries to customers, while using their money in the interim to
speculate for his own account. The Court of Appeals found the corporation liable for its knowing and purposeful encouragement of an
artificial increase in the price of its stock by the broker and its affirmative assistance to Dobich in forestalling any official inquiry into his
conduct. 112 The District Court found the defendant had actual knowledge of the broker's scheme; 1 3 the Court of Appeals agreed." 4
Thus, neither Buttrey nor Brennan reached the question of the amount
of knowledge necessary to sustain liability for aiding and abetting.
Nevertheless, in First Securities the court stated that "liability pred107. 463 F.2d at 987.
108. 463 F.2d at 985.
109. 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 N.S. 838 (1969)
Judge Cummings joined by Chief Judge Castle and Judge Swygert).
110. 410 F.2d at 144.
111. 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
112. 417 F.2d at 154.
113. 286 F. Supp. 702, passim.

114. 417 F.2d at 150-51.

(opinion by
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icated on aiding and abetting may be founded on less than actual
knowledge and participation in the activity proscribed by section 10
and Rule lOb-5." 115 Since in Buttrey the defendant participated in the
scheme by opening an account for and executing securities trades made
by the primary wrongdoer and in Brennan the court found the defendant to have been an affirmative participant with actual knowledge,
one may question whether the court's statement in First Securities, especially in the conjunctive, was soundly based on its own decisions.
In any event, finding First Securities to be a "far more compelling
case" 116 for liability than either Buttrey or Brennan, the court held:
Here, First Securities made Nay its president, provided him with
the trappings of a successful investment counselor, held him out
as providing such counsel, and then willfully allowed Nay's enforcement of a rule regarding the opening of mail which was
antithetical to the prevention of frauds of the type which occurred."1 7
Insofar as the First Securities opinion seems to suggest that aiding
and abetting liability can exist absent either knowledge or affirmative
action it should be regarded as incorrect dictum. The most accurate
analysis of the First Securities fact situation probably is that Nay's ownership of 92% of First Securities together with his use of office stationery
and facilities was sufficient to render First Securities a participant in the
wrongdoing. If aiding and abetting analysis is to be employed, knowledge could be supplied by imputing Nay's knowledge to First Securities despite normal agency principles" 8 and the affirmative conduct aspect is supplied by Nay's affirmative use of First Securities' letterhead
and facilities. A more basic flaw is that "control" and "aiding and
abetting" are not appropriate concepts for a situation involving virtual
identity between the acting party and his corporate shell.
A second Seventh Circuit opinion involving Nay's fraud, also entitled S.E.C. v. First Securities Company of Chicago,"9 involved Nay's
swindle of Arnold Schueren. In 1936 Schueren entrusted certain securities to Nay, granting him a power of attorney. Over the years Nay apparently pledged or sold the securities for his own purposes, while continuing to send Schueren bogus safekeeping receipts and "dividend"
115. 463 F.2d at 987, citing Buttrey (emphasis added).
116. 463 F.2d at 988.

117. 463 F.2d at 988.
118. E.g. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AomCY, §§ 262, 269 (1959).
119. 466 F.2d 1035 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972) ("First
Securities-Il") (opinion by Judge Sprecher joined by Judge Stevens and by Judge Hamley of the Ninth Circuit).
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checks in'the form of cashier's checks. The fraud was discovered
following Schueren's death when Nay was unable to deliver Schueren's
stock certificates to his executor. As with the escrow claimants, the
fraud on Schueren was not conducted through First Securities.
In holding in favor of Schueren's estate 20 the Seventh Circuit
quoted the language in First Securities-I pertaining to First Securities
holding Nay out as a successful counsellor.' 2 ' It added:
First Securities also provided Nay with the printed letterheads,
printed safekeeping receipts, rubber stamps and other supplies
which enabled him to perpetrate and perpetuand accoutrements
1 22
ate his frauds.
The court's reliance on the above factors confirms the conclusion that
the statement in First Securities-I that neither actual knowledge nor participation are necessary elements of aiding and abetting was dictum.
Participation, at least, was present in the First Securities litigation.
The First Securities cases might be read as establishing a low
threshold of liability for aiding and abetting. However, the more recent decision of Sennot v. Rodman & Renshaw'2 3 casts significant
doubt on such an interpretation. The Sennott case involved a claim
that the brokerage firm of Rodman & Renshaw and one of its partners,
William Rothbart (William), should be liable for a fraud perpetrated
on Sennott by William's son Jordan. Jordan was neither an employee
nor partner of Rodman & Renshaw. During the period prior to the
fraud Jordan transmitted securities orders for Sennott directly to Rodman & Renshaw. Subsequently Jordan induced Senott to purchase stock
purportedly available at prices below the current market price through
certain stock options. In fact there were no options and Jordan used
Sennott's money to pay his own trading losses. When Rodman &
120. 466 F.2d at 1040. The court did not consider the power of attorney to be a
significant factor, since there was no evidence that anyone else at First Securities was
aware of it. 466 F.2d at 1040. The Seventh Circuit has not heard the last of the
First Securities litigation. The escrow claimants have sued the Midwest Stock Exchange, of which First Securities was a member organization, on aiding and abetting
grounds. The district court granted the Midwest Stock Exchange a summary judgment (Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 350 F. Supp. 1122 (N.D. Ill. 1972)
(Judge McMillen) ) and plaintiffs have appealed. Case Nos. 72-1977 and -1978. In
that case First Securities' auditors Ernst & Ernst have also been granted summary judgment. Case Nos. 71 C 454, 71 C 1204 (N.D. I11.Aug. 1, 1973) (Judge McMillen),
appeals pending, Case Nos. 73-1907, 73-1908.
121. See text accompanying note 117 supra.
122. 466 F.2d at 1040.
123. 474 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3219 (1973) (Justice
Douglas, joined by Justice Blackmun, dissenting with opinion) (opinion by Judge Pell
joined by Chief Judge Swygert and by Senior Judge Laramore of the Court of Claims).
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Renshaw inquired concerning deposits of Sennott's checks by Jordan
in his wife's bank account Sennott relied upon advice given by Jordan
1 24
and his father and refused to disclose the transactions.
The District Court at a bench trial found all three defendants
liable. 1 25 It found that William had knowledge of the fraud and imputed that knowledge to Rodman & Renshaw. It also found that Rodman & Renshaw knew or should have known of the illegal conduct of
the Rothbarts, that it aided and abetted them in their violations of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts, and that it should be liable as a controlling
2
person.' 6
In reversing the judgment against Rodman & Renshaw, 27 the
only appellant, the Seventh Circuit held there was no basis for a finding
that William had knowledge of the fraudulent scheme at any pertinent
time. 128 After holding that Rodman & Renshaw was not liable on an
apparent authority theory, 29 the Court also rejected liability based on
aiding and abetting. It held:
[O]ur conclusion that the evidence does not support the trial
judge's finding that William Rothbart had knowledge of the fraudulent scheme precludes imposition of liability on that basis. Without a showing that a Rodman partner or agent had knowledge
of the fraudulent acts and in the absence of a showing that here
Jordan was purporting to act for Rodman, there
is no basis for
130
holding Rodman liable for acts of third parties.
The court's ruling on the knowledge point amounts to a narrowing of
the broad statement in the First Securities cases that "liability predicated
on aiding and abetting may be predicated on less than actual knowledge . . .1"I The Sennott case seems to require actual knowledge
of the primary wrongdoer's misconduct as a necessary element of aiding and abetting.
The significance of the statement that no basis exists for aiding
and abetting liability "in the absence of a showing that Jordan was
124. 474 F.2d at 33-37.
125. Sennott v. Rothbart, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,851 (N.D. In. 1970) [19701971 Transfer Binder] (Judge Napoli).
126. Id.
127. 474 F.2d at 40.
128. 474 F.2d at 38.
129. 474 F.2d at 38-39. In reversing the apparent authority finding the Seventh
Circuit stated that Sennott failed to prove that "he was relying upon Jordan's apparent
authority," citing Crittendon v. State Oil Co., 78 Ill. App. 2d 112, 222 N.E.2d 561
(1966) for the reliance requirement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8,
Comment (d) (1959).
130. 474 F.2d at 39. (Emphasis added.)
131. S.E.C. v. First Securities Co. of Chicago, 463 F.2d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 1972).
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purporting to act for" Rodman & Renshaw is not clear. It does not
aid in interpreting the earlier statement in the First Securities cases
that "aiding and abetting liability may be found on something less
than actual knowledge and participation."' 8 2 If anything, the statement in Sennott suggests that active participation is required.
The foregoing critique may appear to demand too much analytical precision from the court. However, in the knowledge area the
court has been unnecessarily imprecise and seemingly inconsistent.
While most courts seem to hold that some degree of knowledge of the
primary wrong is a prerequisite for aiding and abetting liability in a
private action,' 3 3 the Seventh Circuit has seemed to take inconsistent
positions regarding the knowledge requirement.' 3 4 This apparent contradiction within the Seventh Circuit should be resolved at an early
date, preferably in accord with the position that knowledge of the
wrongdoing is a requirement for aiding and abetting liability.
The Seventh Circuit also reversed the finding that Rodman &
Renshaw was liable as a controlling person. It stated that control person liability
extends only to transactions with or by [its partners and agents]
where Rodman is itself involved. To extend it further would be
to impose liability upon Rodman for virtually any act of its past
or present employees and partners regardless of how
3 5 remote and
unrelated that act might be to Rodman & Renshaw.'
The court appeared to be saying that control person liability extends
only to those activities in which the controlling person in fact exerts
control. However, the affirmative defense in Section 20(a) that the
control person will not be liable if he "acted in good faith and did not
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation"
seems a better means for exonerating control persons.
132. Id.
133. Brennan, supra note 7, 417 F.2d at 150-51, 154; Buttrey, supra note 109, 410
F.2d at 144; Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 413 F.2d 353, 358 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970) (opinion by Judge Cummings joined
by Senior Judge Duffy and Judge Fairchild); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 192
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21, 28 (S.D.N.Y.
1963). In re Caesars Palace Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366, 388 (E.D. Pa.
1973) ("This Court is unaware of any definition of 'aiding and abetting' which does
not encompass the element of knowledge").

See generally Ruder, Multiple Defendants

at 630-38.
134. Sennott was argued less than two weeks after both First Securities cases and
decided long after them. Chief Judge Swygert sat on both the First Securities-I and
Sennott panels, writing the opinion in First Securities-I. No case under the federal
securities laws was cited in Sennott.
135. 474 F.2d at 40.
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In any event, the reversal of control person liability could have
been achieved on narrower grounds. The Court's statements suggest that it would have reversed the judgment against William had he
appealed, since William had no knowledge of the option scheme until
it was a fait accompli and since he did not participate in any way. 13 If
William was not liable, Rodman & Renshaw could not be liable by
7
virtue of its control over him. It did not control Jordan.'1
Still a fourth recent case has added a further gloss to aiding and
abetting liability. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Advance
Growth Capital Corporation1 8 the SEC brought an action under various provisions of the Investment Company Act against Advance
Growth Capital Corporation, a small business investment company, its
chairman and its president to enjoin the individual defendants from
violating the Investment Company Act and from serving as officers
or directors of any regulated investment company and to appoint a
receiver to conduct the affairs of Advance Growth. The District
Court refused to grant relief on the grounds that while the defendants
had violated the Investment Company Act the violations were inadvertent. 139 The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the violations
were knowing and wilful, and the case was remanded for entry of an
order permanently enjoining the individual defendants from violating
the Investment Company Act.' 4 °
As described by the Court of Appeals, the defendants' violations
136. At most, William permitted Jordan to act as an intermediary for transmission

of William's stock recommendations to Sennott and Sennott's orders to Rodman &
Renshaw, thereby creating a relationship of trust and confidence between Sennott and
Rodman & Renshaw. The district court focused upon the appaent acquiescence of

Rodman & Renshaw in allowing Jordan to use the Rodman phone on the Board of
Tade floor to place orders for va icus persons, including Ser.nott.

Qu-ry whether,

absent foreknowledge of Jordan's option scheme, that conduct constituted aiding and
abetting by William.
137. The court also found that Rodman & Renshaw had established a good faith
defense under Section 20(a) because it had no knowledge of the underlying fraud.
474 F.2d at 40 n.5. To the extent the court meant to imply that a p oof of good

faith alone will give it a defense under Section 20(a) it is probably in error.

The

court stated, "Liability is not imposed where the controlling person exercises good

faith or does not induce the act ....
be no liability under this section."

" and "without bad faith or inducement there can
474 F.2d at 40 n.5. (Emphasis added.) Section

20(a) expresses these requirements in the conjunctive ("acted i good faith and did
not directly or indirectly induce") and places the burden on the defendant.
138. 470 F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1972) (opinion by Senior Judge Munah of the Tenth

Circuit joined by Senior Judge Duffy and Chief Judge Juergens of the Eastern District
of Illinois).
139. Unreported decision (N.D. Ill.) (Judge Perry).
140. 470 F.2d at 63. On March 28, 1973 the court of appeals granted a writ of

mandamus directing Judge Perry to enter the injunction as previously ordered by the
court of appeals. SEC LITIGATIoN RELEASE 5835.
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were flagrant, especially with respect to transactions between Advance
Growth and its statutory affiliates. 4' More important for present purposes is that the defendants were also found to have violated Section
34(b) of the Investment Company Act 14 ' which makes it unlawful to
make an untrue statement or omit a material statement from the annual
reports filed with the SEC. 4 ' The annual reports of Advance Growth,
prepared by its accountants, were signed by the president of Advance
Growth, who knew them to be false. The chairman, who also knew
them to be false and who did not sign them, was also held to be in
violation of the Act. The court stated:
Giachini [the chairman] had actual knowledge of the transactions which should have been disclosed, as well as the duty and
authority to see that they were disclosed. By his silence and inaction Giachini aided and abetted the incomplete disclosure and,
along with Murphy [the44 president], was responsible for the violations of Section 34(b).'
In imposing liability for aiding and abetting by "silence and inaction"
the Seventh Circuit again demonstrated an unfortunate tendency to
rationalize its decisions in ways which fail to take into account implications for other cases. The Advance Growth involved knowing dissemination of misleading financial statements. The fact that Giachini,
the chairman, did not sign the statements would not relieve him of
liability for transmitting them. Despite the fact that his conduct probably amounted to active participation in fraudulent conduct, the
court chose 'to base its liability on aiding and abetting. In any event,
the "silence and inaction" type of aiding and abetting is best analyzed
as dependent upon an independent duty to take action. In Advance
Growth the court found such a duty, stating: "Officers and directors
of investment companies should not be allowed to avoid their statutory
45
duties so easily."1
The cases relied upon in Advance Growth do not necessarily support the theory of "aiding and abetting by inaction" in private lawsuits.
In the Brennan case the Court of Appeals expressly reserved the in141. Affiliated persons are defined in Section 2(a)(3) of the Investment Company
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (1971).
Section 17 of the Investment Company Act,
15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1971), prohibits certain transactions between investment companies
and affiliates.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-33(b) (1971).
143. 470 F.2d at 51-52.
144. 470 F.2d at 52. The presence of actual knowledge is not significant. The
question raised in the text supra accompanying notes 133 et seq. was whether actual

knowledge was necessary; it is clear that it is sufficient where other elements are
found.
145. 470 F.2d at 52.
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action point.'4" In Buttrey 47 the defendant was alleged to have affirmatively assisted the primary wrongdoer. The court also relied on
two decisions involving SEC injunctive actions,14 but the elements of
proof required in such suits are less than required in a private action
for damages 49 and the cases themselves are also distinguishable. It
is therefore fair to state that Advance Growth Capital did not resolve
any of the open questions on private civil liability for aiding and abet50

ting.1

DASHO V. SUSQUEHANNA CORPORATION; SWANSON V. AMERICAN
CONSUMER INDUSTRIES, INC.

Two recent cases, both before the Seventh Circuit for the second
time, cut across many aspects of private actions under the 1934 Act.
Dasho v. Susquehanna Corporation' aand Swanson v. American Consumer Industries, Inc. 5 ' both involve complicated issues under Rule
lOb-5 and Federal Proxy Rule 14a-9.
The decisions in both cases were influenced by the Supreme
Court's decision in Mills v. Electric Auto-Life Company.'53 In that
case Electric Auto-Lite ("Auto-Lite") shareholders complained that
the proxy statement pertaining to a proposed merger of Auto-Lite
and its majority shareholder Mergenthaler Linotype Company ("Mergenthaler") was materially misleading because it did not adequately
disclose Mergenthaler's control over Auto-Lite's board. The District
Court held that the proxy statement was materially misleading under
Rule 14a-9, but that the plaintiff must prove a causal connection between the omission and any injury to the plaintiff, who was now a
shareholder of the merged enterprise.' 4 It later found that the defective proxy statement was causally related to the merger since the
votes of minority shareholders were necessary to obtain the two-thirds

146. 417 F.2d at 155.
147. Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1969).
148. S.E.C. v. North Am. R. & D. Corp., 424 F.2d 63, 81 (2d Cir. 1970); S.E.C. v.
Nat'l Bankers Life Ins. Co., 334 F. Supp. 444, 456 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
149. S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963).

150. For a discussion of aiding and abetting by inaction, see Ruder, Multiple Defendants, at 641-44.
151. 461 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972) ("DashoII") (opinion by Judge Stevens joined by Judges Fairchild and Cummings).
152. 475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1973) ("Swanson-II") (opinion by Judge Cummings
joined by Senior Judge Kilkenny of the Ninth Circuit; Judge Sprecher dissenting).

153.

396 U.S. 375 (1970).

154. Unreported decision (N.D. Ill. 1966) (Judge Parsons).
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vote required to approve the merger.1

5

On appeal the Seventh Circuit agreed that the proxy statement was
misleading, but the court required a hearing on the question whether a sufficient number of the minority shareholders relied on the
proxy statement to show the required causal connection. Since proof
of reliance by thousands of shareholders was not feasible, the court
ruled that existence of a causal connection would depend upon the
fairness of the merger terms. The court assumed that a sufficient
number of the minority shareholders would have voted for a fair
merger even if the proxy statement had been inaccurate and incomplete on the control issue. 15 6
The Supreme Court reversed, 15 7 holding that once it is established that a misstatement in or omission from a proxy statement is material,
[t]here is no need to supplement this requirement, as did the
Court of Appeals, with a requirement of proof of whether the
defect actually had a decisive effect on the voting. Where there
has been a finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a sufficient showing of causal relationship between the violation and the
injury for which he seeks redress if, as here, he proves that the
proxy solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect in the
solicitation materials, was an essential link in the accomplishment
of the transaction.' 58
Thus, fairness of the terms of the merger did not insulate defendants
from liability and the plaintiff was not required to prove actual reliance on the proxy statement by anyone.' 5 9 The fairness question
was still at issue, however, since the court indicated that the fairness of
the merger terms would be relevant on the issue of damages. In remanding the case, it indicated clearly that equitable relief would be
available and might include an accounting, restructuring of the merger,
or setting aside the merger.
The Supreme Court's holding in Mills that in a proxy nondisclosure case the element of reliance would be satisfied by a showing of
materiality, its statement that fairness of the merger would be treated
155. 281 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (Judge Parsons).
156. 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968) (opinion by Judge Fairchild joined by Judges
Swygert and Kerner).
157. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
158. 396 U.S. at 384-85.
159. However, the Supreme Court did not have before it, and expressly did not
pass upon, the situation where the defendants directly control enough votes to approve
the transaction, e.g. in Mills, if Mergenthaler owned 67% of Auto-Lite stock. 396 U.S.
at 385 n.7.
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as part of the relief question, and its acknowledgement of the broad
scope of available remedies provided important background for the
decisions in Dasho-H and Swanson-H.
Dasho-Il was one of three cases in the Seventh Circuit which grew
out of the 1965 merger of The Susquehanna Corporation ("SusquePlainhanna") and American Gypsum Company ("Gypsum"). 160
tiffs, stockholders of Susquehanna, sued derivatively contending that
past and present Susquehanna directors violated the federal securities
laws in three 1965 transactions.' 6 '
The initial transaction involved the private sale of an allegedly
controlling block of 430,000 shares by Susquehanna insiders to
Herbert Korholz, chief executive officer of Gypsum. The price
paid was approximately 15% in excess of current market quotations
for Susquehanna shares. As a condition of consummation of the
sale, Susquehanna's chairman and four other directors who sold their
stock resigned and were replaced by Korholz and three of his nominees.162 Subsequently Gypsum and Susquehanna merged, and the
debt incurred by Gypsum to acquire the shares purchased by Korholz
was thus assumed by Susquehanna, as the surviving corporation.
After the first transaction was announced, a representative of a
minority group of Susquehanna stockholders threatened to sue to unseat the new directors and recover for Susquehanna the alleged premium
received by the sellers. After Korholz's election as chairman, he negotiated a transaction with the minority group wherein Susquehanna
sold its holdings in stock of Vanadium Corporation of America
("VCA") in exchange for the minority group's Susquehanna stock
and cash on the basis of the then market prices of VCA and Susquehanna stocks. Susquehanna had acquired nearly 10% of the VCA
common stock in a series of transactions beginning in 1960. Subsequently VCA obtained an injunction which pervented Susquehanna
from buying more VCA stock or voting the stock it owned. The
160. The others are Mueller v. Korholz, 449 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 922 (1972) (under Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1971)) (opinion by Judge Stevens, joined by Judges Kiley and Fairchild), and Berman
v. Thomson, 312 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. I1. 1970) (under Rule 14a-9) (Judge Austin).
161. The district court dismissed certain of the claims. 267 F. Supp. 508 (N.D.
111. 1966) (Judge Marovitz). The court of appeals held that plaintiffs had stated a
claim and had standing to sue derivatively under Rule lob-5 in connection with the
merger with Gypsum, whereby Susquehanna issued its common stock to Gypsum's
shareholders. Dasho-I, supra note 79. The case was then tried without a jury and the
district court found in favor of the defendants on all claims. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
92,575 (N.D. I1. 1970) [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] (Judge Marovitz).

162. 461 F.2d at 16-17. It was a fifteen member board.
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group which acquired the VCA stock negotiated a resale to VCA itself
at a price approximately $700,000 in excess of what they paid for the
VCA stock, apparently because the VCA stock in their hands was not
subject to the voting restrictions. The transactions were closed simultaneously.1 6
Plaintiffs' complaint included allegations 1) that the sale of Susquehanna stock amounted to sale of control of Susquehanna without making a similar opportunity available to all Susquehanna stockholders; 2) that Susquehanna had been damaged when the board
approved the sale of the VCA stock for allegedly inadequate
consideration; 3) that the insiders did not adequately investigate
Korholz before selling control; 4) that the merger exchange ratio
should be evaluated; and 5) that the proxy statement pertaining to the
merger of Susquehanna and Gypsum failed to set forth all material
facts pertaining to the VCA exchange and pertaining to the series
of transactions whereby Korholz purchased the Susquehanna stock on
behalf of Gypsum.'
The District Court refused plaintiffs demand
for a jury trial and after a bench trial found in favor of the defendants
on all issues.' 65
On appeal, the Seventh Circuct, relying on the Supreme Court's
decision in Ross v. Bernhard, 6 held that a right to jury trial exists in
a derivative action for legal, but not equitable, claims. 167 Its opinion
therefore consisted in part of an analysis of the entire case for the purpose of deciding which issues were not supported by sufficient evi168
dence to take the case to the jury.
The Mills holdings became important in two phases of the
court's decision, both dealing with the alleged proxy violations. With
regard to causation, after holding that there was enough evidence
to go to the jury on the issue of material omission from the proxy statement, 6 9 the court considered whether there was sufficient proof of "a
causal connection between the violation and an injury to Susque163. 461 F.2d at 17-18.
164. 461 F.2d at 18-20.
165. Supra note 161.
166. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
167. Id. at 532-33, 542.
168. 461 F.2d at 20-23. The court also had to determine which claims were
legal and which equitable. If enough evidence was offered on the legal claims to establish a prima facie case, the denial of the jury trial was not harmless and each such
claim had to be retried by a jury. 461 F.2d at 25. The review of the equitable
claims was made under the clearly erroneous standard of FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Consideration of the court's differentiation between legal and equitable claims in Dasho-iI
is beyond the scope of this article.
169. 461 F.2d at 29.
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hanna.' ' 7 0° In terms of the language of Mills, the proxy statement
in Dasho was "an essential link in the accomplishment of the merger,"
since the vote of the minority shareholders was required. However,
the court noted that the Mills holding that a finding of materiality
constitutes a sufficient showing of causation between the violation and
the injury did not necessarily establish all necessary elements of causation in Dasho.'7 ' In Mills, the shareholders were "trying to vindicate
their right to be shareholders of a separate company," 172 and any material omission would have influenced their vote. However, in Dasho the
shareholders were limited to a modification of the exchange ratio:
[H]ere the merger itself was apparently unobjectionable and a
damage award must, in effect, depend on a revision of the exchange ratio. Thus, although the Mills holding would seem to require a finding of "legal injury" caused by the violation,
in this
1 73
case that injury may not include any pecuniary loss.
The court noted that, since no evidence had been introduced supporting the proposition that Susquehanna would have been better off
with no merger, 1 74 the only question for remand was whether a better
ratio would have been available. 1 75 In other words, proof of a Rule
76
14a-9 violation does not alone establish entitlement to any remedy.
In reaching this conclusion the court imposed a further condition
upon recovery. It indicated that if the Gypsum stockholders would
not have approved an exchange ratio less favorable to themselves,
Susquehanna could not have suffered compensable damage. 1 77 Thus,
on remand the defendants could offer proof that less than two-thirds of
Gypsum's shares would have been voted in favor of an exchange ratio
less favorable to Gypsum. The result of the court's analysis may allow introduction of the very kind of proof that Mills' materiality analy170. 461 F.2d at 28-29.
171. 461 F.2d at 30.
172. 461 F.2d at 30. On the remand of Mills, the district court granted defendants a partial summary judgment, finding that it would be impracticable to rescind the
Auto-Lite-Mergenthaler merger. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,354 (N.D. Ill. 1972)
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] (Judge Parsons). "If it can be shown that plaintiffs suffered an injury by reason of the merger, they may be adequately compensated by
money damages." Id., at 91,900.
173. 461 F.2d at 30 (footnote omitted). Presumably any two profitable companies
could be merged on some terms which would be fair to the stockholders of both corporations. It must therefore seem anomalous to a businessman to hear a court say that
there was nothing wrong with the merger, but the exchange ratio was not fair.
To mix the metaphors, "The operation was a success but the patient died."
174. 461 F.2d at 31.
175. 461 F.2d at 31.
176. See text accompanying notes 196 et seq. infra.
177. 461 F.2d at 31.

SECURITIES LAW

sis was designed to avoid: proof regarding the likely voting propensi17
ties of a diverse mass of stockholders had there been full disclosure. 1
Mills clearly held that, in general, fairness of the merger terms
does not insulate a transaction from scrutiny under Rule 14a-9. Therefore, the extensive consideration in Dasho-H regarding proof that Susquehanna suffered damage in the merger should be regarded as inappropriate to the question of liability. Instead, it should be viewed
as relevant to the question whether plaintiffs were entitled to a jury
trial rather than to the question of liability. If Susquehanna had suffered no damage, the only remedy to which plaintiffs would have been
entitled would have been rescission, as sought in Mills. 179 Rescission
is an equitable remedy which raises no issue requiring a jury trial. In
Dasho-H the court found that a damage issue existed, since the terms
of the merger with Gypsum might have damaged Susquehanna, even
if the merger itself did not cause such damage. 180 It therefore remanded
the Rule 14a-9 claim for a jury trial.
Turning to the equitable claims, although the plaintiffs asked
that the merger be set aside or an arbiter be appointed to redetermine
the ratio, the court found neither form of relief feasible. The merger
itself, as distinguished from the terms of the merger, did not harm
Susquehanna or its stockholders"' and it was "too late to permit an
arbiter to remake the bargain which the minority shareholders of Gyp12
sum accepted."'
DECEPTION

With regard to issues other than those stemming from Mills, the
court reached results which provide important precedent. In dealing
with the claim that the exchange of VCA stock for Susquehanna stock
violated Rule lOb-5, the court followed the now established principle
that a corporation may be damaged when some directors are deceived
by others in approving a purchase or sale of securities by the corporation.'8 3 The plaintiffs contended -that although Korholz and other
directors knew that the VCA stock could be sold to VCA itself at a
price in excess of market price, those directors chose to deceive the
178. Korholz himself owned more than one-third of the Gypsum stock.
at 15.
179. Supra note 156, 403 F.2d at 435.
180. 461 F.2d at 31.
181. 461 F.2d at 31.
182. 461 F.2d at 31.
183. See cases cited supra note 79.

461 F.2d
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board and induce it to sell the VCA stock to the minority group of
Susquehanna stockholders. In remanding this issue for jury consideration, the court laid down several broad principles. It noted
first that there would be no violation of Rule lOb-5 even if material
facts were not disclosed to the stockholders
if a disinterested majority of the board of directors was fully informed about all relevant facts, and if in the good faith exercise
of their business judgment they concluded that the transaction
was in the best interests of the corporation. For on that hypothesis, since a disinterested majority of the board would have
the authority to consummate the transaction, the disclosure
within
1 84
the board would constitute disclosure to the corporation.
It continued the analysis by stating that a Rule lOb-5 violation
would result if either of two factual propositions were established, as

follows:
First, if material facts were misrepresented or withheld from some
members of the board of directors, the corporation was deceived.
. . .Second, if the entire board of directors was interested in the
transaction, a duty of disclosure to the shareholders
existed, and
the corporation was deceived by the nondisclosure. 185
These broad statements offer important guidance in Rule lOb-5 suits
involving corporate transactions. Under the Dasho doctrine, once
adequate disclosure is made to a disinterested body of directors or
shareholders, the protection of the business judgment rule will be
available. In the absence of full disclosure to a disinterested body a
corporate transaction involving interested corporate officers, directors
or controlling shareholders may be set aside on the grounds of nondisclosure, apparently without regard to the fairness of the transaction.
In a series of summary statements at the end of the Dasho-H
opinion the Seventh Circuit dealt with other contentions of the
plaintiff, providing indications of its positions on several important
problems.
INSIDE INFORMATION

The court found no evidence that purchases had been made
based upon inside information,1 6 but it acknowledged its support of
the general principle by stating:
184. 461 F.2d at 25 (footnote omitted).

However, exoneration on the Rule

lOb-5 aspect of the VCA sale would not resolve whether all material facts pertaining

to the sale were adequately disclosed in the proxy statement. 461 F.2d at 29 n.47.
185. 461 F.2d at 26 (footnote omitted).
186. "The archtypal lOb-5 case is the purchase by one group in a closed corpora-
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We would agree that if the directors, having knowledge of
such an offer, had purchased shares at a lower price on the open
market in order to assemble a block to be sold to Korholz at
the premium price, those purchases on the open market would be
securities transactions covered by Rule lOb-5.1 87
In denying that "Rule lOb-5 imposes an obligation on controlling
shareholders to make prompt disclosure of every offer they receive,"'' s
the court utilized a relatively conservative test for materiality, referring
to "those situations which are essentially extraordinary in nature and
which are reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the market
price of the security . . 189 In view of the more liberal definition
used by other courts in defining materiality it is doubtful that the
Seventh Circuit's Dasho-H definition will be followed in later cases.
The most serious challenge to that definition is posed by the decision
in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. U.S.: ".

. material in the sense that a

reasonable investor might have considered them important in the making of this decision." 9 0
In another sense, the court may have anticipated current attempts to bring "outside" or "market" facts within the ambit of Rule
10b-5.19 ' The court rejected a claim that an obligation existed to
disclose that Korholz was willing to pay $15 a share for 430,000
shares of Susquehanna stock by stating that this information was not
"information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose."192
tion of the interest of another, without disclosing negotiations for sale or other disposition of the issuer's assets or its securities at a higher price." BROMBERG, supra
note 63, Sec. 4.2, page 70 (footnote omitted).

For what may be the most open-ended

liability for insider trading, see Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The leading SEC statement on this issue may be
found in In re Investors Management Co., SECURITIEs Ex. ACT. REL. 9267, CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. %78,163 (S.E.C. 1971) [1970-1971 Transfer Binder].
187. 461 F.2d at 32.

188. Id. (footnote omitted). There is also, authority that a corporation can recover profits obtained by insiders who trade on inside information. Schein v. Chasen,
478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), pet. for cert. pending, Docket 73-439; Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 29 A.2d 285, 287 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1968), a! 'd, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.
2d 78 (1969).
189. 461 F.2d at 32 n.55, citing S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), and quoting from Fleischer,
Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas
Gulf Sulphur Proceedings, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1289 (1965).
190. 406 U.S. 128, 153-154 (1972).
But see Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,
478 F.2d 1281, 1302 (2d Cir. 1973) suggesting that "would" is a better test than

"might" because the latter is "too suggestive of mere possibility, however unlikely."

191. See Fleischer, Mundheim and Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 421 U. PA. L. REV. 798 (1973).

192. 461 F.2d at 32, n.55, quoting from Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
907, 912 (1961).
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In so doing it seemed to be restricting the inside information doctrine
to corporate facts.
SALE OF CONTROL

The court also rejected the claim that the premium received by
those who sold to Korholz was a corporate asset which could be recovered by the corporation. It held that the owner of a controlling block
of stock has a right to sell it for a premium."13 While that is something of an overstatement,' 9 4 it is essentially correct.9 5
THE SWANSON-II APPROACH TO MILLS

In its Dasho-H decision the Seventh Circuit demonstrated that significant unresolved questions remained after Mills. More important,
its Dasho-Il opinion demonstrated the continued vitality of the distinction between causation in fact and legal, or proximate, cause. This
long-standing distinction in tort law' 9 6 has sometimes been recognized
in cases under the federal securities laws, 9 7 but it has not received
adequate detailed judicial scrutiny. In Rule 14a-9 cases factual cause
will be demonstrated by proof that the proxy statement caused the
merger. Such factual proof does not, however, answer the policy or
"legal cause" question whether the defective proxy statement caused
actionable harm. The second decision in Swanson v. American Consumer Industries,'9" gave the court an opportunity to answer additional
open questions involving claims predicated on defective proxy statements, some of them bearing on the cause question.
The action involved a derivative claim by a minority shareholder
of Peoria Service Company ("Peoria") that a proxy statement soliciting
193. 461 F.2d at 33.
194. Cases where under special circumstances the sale of voting or working control
may be a wrong about which the corporation or its minority shareholders may complain include Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 952 (1955); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Herpich v.
Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 81 Cal. Rptr.
592, 460 P.2d 468 (1969); Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781
(1969).
195. See Haberman v. Murchison, 331 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 335 F. Supp.
286 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), affirmed, 468 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1972).
196. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971).
197. The damage limitation in Section 11(e) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k
(e) (1971), limits liability to the loss attributable to the particular defects in the registration statement, although the burden of proof is on the defendant. For judicial recognition of the problem in a case under Rule lOb-5, see Guarantee Ins. Agency Co. v.
Mid-Continent Realty Corp., 57 F.R.D. 555, 560 (N.D. 111. 1972) (Judge McLaren).
See also Ruder and Cross, supra, note 63, 1972 DuKE L.J. at 1138-40.
198. Supra note 152.
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shareholder approval of the sale of Peoria's assets to American Consumer Industries ("AC") did not reveal that ACI controlled Peoria's
board of directors through its 90% ownership of United States Cold
Corporation ("U.C. Cold"), which in turn owned 87% of Peoria's
stock.
Plaintiff, who voted against the reorganization, brought suit under Rule lOb-5.199 The District Court granted summary judgment
for the defendants, the three corporations.2"' In its first decision the
Seventh Circuit had held that the proxy materials were misleading
as a matter of law because of the failure to disclose the conflict of
interest of the Peoria directors, certain facts pertaining to the value of
Peoria's stock and ACI's plans for Peoria's assets. 201 It had rejected
defendants' contention that since U.S. Cold owned 87% of Peoria's
stock there could be no causation between the proxy materials and
the reorganization, stating that "We are not prepared to sanction a
rule of causation which would presume that full disclosures to minority
shareholders could have no transactional function in corporate affairs.12 2 It noted that the minority, if fully informed, might have
claimed appraisal rights,20 which could have affected ACI's decision
to move ahead or to alter the plan and that, if the allegations were
true, Peoria shareholders might have been entitled to a more favorable
exchange ratio. Accordingly, the case was remanded for trial.
On remand, the District Court again held for the defendants,
finding that even though the proxy materials were deceptive the plaintiff had failed to prove either a causal connection between the deception and consummation of the plan or reliance on the proxy material,
had failed to prove injury, and had failed to prove that the defendants
breached any fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders. Moreover,
defendants had proved that ACI paid a fair value for Peoria's assets
and the exchange ratio was fair.2 04
199. 475 F.2d at 522 (7th Cir. 1973). The coverage of the federal proxy rules
extends only to those companies whose securities are registered under Section 12 of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1971). Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)
(1971). Peoria's stock was not so registered. Rule 10b-5 did apply, however, since the
Peoria proxy statement was used to accomplish a transaction whereby Peoria and ulti-

mately its shareholders acquired stock of ACI. The suit was brought derivatively and
as a class action on behalf of the minority shareholders of Peoria. 415 F.2d 1326 (7th
Cir. 1969) (opinion by Judge Cummings joined by Judge Kerer; Judge Swygert dis-

senting) ("Swanson-I").
1968) (Judge Morgan).
200. 288 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Ill.
201. 415 F.2d 1326.

202. id. at 1332 (footnote omitted).
203. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.73.
1971) (Judge Morgan).
204. 328 F. Supp. 797 (S.D. 111.
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On appeal plaintiff urged that Mills mandated a finding that
there was causation between the proxy material and the transaction.
Defendants maintained that since ACI controlled 87% of Peoria's
shares there could be no such causal connection. In response, the
Seventh Circuit noted its earlier careful distinction between a Rule
14a-9 case in which the merger itself is the alleged injury and a Rule
lOb-5 case in which other injury is claimed.20 5 It then210 noted its difficulty with the causation question under circumstances in which the
defendants had the votes necessary to control the outcome (a question
left open in Mills)20 7 but concluded that in any event it would be
dubious to assume that minority shareholders whose votes are unnecessary to the effectuation of a merger would have some extraproxy power to prevent or alter the terms20of a merger which the
majority has proven was fair and had merit.
Despite its reservation, the court assumed that causation had been established "even in this situation" 20 9 and held that since the defendant
had demonstrated that the merger terms were fair the plaintiffs were
not entitled to a "retrospective revision of the merger terms."2 1
The court stated the causation principle established in Dasho-Il
and Swanson-IH in a single sentence: "What suffices to show causation of a legal injury-the merger--does not automatically show plaintiffs suffered compensable monetary injury. "211 To that extent the
two decisions may be seen as limiting the impact of the statement in
Mills that a material omission in a proxy statement is sufficient to establish a causal relationship between the proxy statement and the
merger. 212 The court seems to be stating that the Mills causation
approach only reaches the first causal stage. Where the merger is fair,
legal cause concepts may be introduced to deny relief based upon restructuring of the merger. Notably this approach avoided the necessity of inquiring whether factual cause could exist where the wrongdoer
controlled sufficient shares to approve the merger without a vote
by the minority.
Nevertheless the court indicated that, despite this holding as to
the merger, recovery of a different sort would be available if the de205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

475 F.2d at 518 n.2.
Id.
396 U.S. at 385 n.7, cited at 475 F.2d at 518; see note 159 supra.
475 F.2d at 519 n.2.
Id. at 519.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 520.
396 U.S. at 385.
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ception had caused injury other than that flowing directly from the
merger. On remand from the earlier Swanson decision the District
Court found no proof of reliance or causation supporting any wrongfully induced loss of appraisal rights. However, relying on Affiliated
Ute Citizens,21 3 the Seventh Circuit stated that "causation and reliance are no longer factually-to-be-proven predicates to recovery" in an
action under Rule lOb-5. 214 It held that since the minority shareholders in Swanson-I had proven a material defect in the proxy materials and since they suffered damage by being induced not to exercise
their appraisal rights, they "have proven all the elements required."2115
Plaintiffs thus were to be given the opportunity to receive in cash the
difference between the fair value of what they did receive and what
they would have received had there been no unlawful conduct.2 16 The
court awarded them cash in an amount equal to the value of Peoria
stock as attributed to it in the reorganization plan, with interest, in ex21 7
change for or in lieu of the ACI stock originally offered.
Judge Sprecher filed a strong dissent.2 18 Not only did he compare the fiduciary situation in Affiliated Ute Citizens to that in
Swanson-Il, 21 9 but he would also have held that causation necessarily
follows from materiality even where the defendant controls sufficient
votes to approve the transaction. 220 He argued that causation should
be established either by a conclusive presumption of reliance from materiality or by a presumption of causation from materiality. Judge
Sprecher further asserted that the dominant owner should not be virtually exempt from full disclosure when the holder of less than full
control is not exempt. He argued that "the greater the percentage of
213. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
214. 475 F.2d at 520. The court's reading of Affiliated Ute Citizens may be
unnecessarily broad, since the Supreme Court may have held only that reliance need not
be proven in an action under Rule lob-5 where the gravamen of the claim is nondisclosure by one in a fiduciary relationship to the plaintiff with a clear obligation to
make full disclosure of all material facts. Swanson-II could have been decided on that
narrower reading, thereby avoiding the more sweeping proposition that proof of reliance
is a thing of the past in non-disclosure cases.
215. 475 F.2d at 521. The suit was also maintained as a class action on behalf of
the minority shareholders.
216. 475 F.2d at 521, citing 406 U.S. at 155.
217. 475 F.2d at 521. It is not clear how the minority shareholders were damaged. The court affirmed the finding that the exchange ratio was fair, and so the
ACI stock received presumably had a cash value equal to the Peoria stock surrendered.
218. 475 F.2d at 522. The Slip Opinion of Swanson-IT labeled Judge Sprecher's
opinion as a dissent. The official version printed at 475 F.2d at 522 identifies his
opinion as concurring in the result of reversal but dissenting as to the remedy on
remand.
219. 475 F.2d at 523. See note 214 supra.
220. 475 F.2d at 523-24. He did not discuss the merger fairness point raised by
the majority at 475 F.2d at 518-19 n.2.
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control by the controlling shareholder, the greater the protection required for the minority shareholders."' 2 ' Judge Sprecher would have

ordered rescission, or at the very least awarded a higher appraisal figure based on the going concern rather than liquidating value of Pe-

oria's assets, as proven at trial.222
INTERIM CONCLUSION

Jannes, Dasho-H and Swanson-H cut across the entire scope of
implied civil liability under the 1934 Act. These cases demonstrate
that implied liability under the federal securities laws has resulted in a
substantial body of federal common law of corporations, which also
often serves as a method of buttressing more traditional concepts of
corporate law. Jannes grants extensive federal rights to a corporation
whose directors have breached their common law duty. Dasho-H
has a similar effect. The result in Swanson-H was to vindicate statutory appraisal rights. Without passing judgment on the propriety of
this aspect of federal securities law, it is hoped that the Seventh Circuit
will give explicit consideration to the implications of its opinions on the
federal law of corporate fiduciary relations.
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR A VIOLATION OF A RULE OF THE

NASD

As an additional ground for the liability of First Securities Company of Chicago for the depredations of Nay recounted in First Securities-I and -11,22a the Seventh Circuit held that First Securities had violated one of the Rules of Fair Practice of the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD). Before turning to the court's analysis, it is necessary to consider the background of this theory of private
civil liability.2 24
221. 475 F.2d at 524. The Swanson-fl situation presents an interesting example
of the interrelationship of state and federal law. The Delaware General Corporation
Law now permits stockholders of a corporation to take action by consent, presumably
including mergers as well as the election of directors (Section 228). A controlling
stockholder, like ACI, might be tempted to take action by its own consent and then
present the remaining, minority stockholders with the option of taking appraisal rights
or accepting stock of the survivor, thereby avoiding the risk of distributing any proxy
materials. However, SEC Rule 14c-2 requires the issuer to provide an information
statement to stockholders containing information similar to that which would have
been sent in a proxy solicitation. The information statement must be sent twenty days
prior to the earliest date on which corporate action must be taken.
222. 475 F.2d at 528-29. Judge Sprecher disagreed with a number of the findings
by the district court, e.g. he would have found a breach of fiduciary duty by the
defendants. 475 F.2d at 525-26.
223. Text accompanying notes 98 et seq. supra.
224. Commentary on civil liability for a violation of a stock exchange or a na-
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One of the primary purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 was to improve the honesty and fairness of trading on securities
exchanges and in the over-the-counter market. 22 5 Toward that end,
Section 5226 of the 1934 Act provided that it was unlawful for a
broker to effect a transaction on a securities exchange unless the exchange was registered under Section 6227 or was exempt from registration. Section 6(b) provides that no exchange can be registered unless
its rules
[provide] for the expulsion, suspension, or disciplining of a member [of the exchange] for conduct or proceeding inconsistent with
just and equitable principles of trade .... 228
Section 15A of the 1934 Act, 229 added by the Maloney Act of 1938,23 o
provides for the registration of national securities associations, i.e. associations of brokers or dealers. An association cannot be registered unless, inter alia, its rules
are designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade ....
The NASD is the only registered association.
Relatively early on, in terms of the development of civil liability
under the federal securities laws, it was held that an exchange can be
civilly liable to those who suffer damage as a result of the failure of the
exchange to enforce its own rules.2 3 2 It was not until much more recently that a court stated that in some situations a member of an extional securities association rule include Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based upon

Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 12 (1966); Lowenfels, Private Enforcement
in the Over-the-Counter Securities Markets: Implied Liabilities Based on NASD Rules,
51 CORNELL L.Q. 633 (1966); Shipman, Two Current Questions Concerning Private
Rights of Action under the Exchange Act: Authority of the Administrative Agency to
Negate; Existence for Violation of Self-Regulatory Requirements, 17 W. REs. L. REV.
925 (1966); Comment, Private Actions as a Remedy for Violations of Stock Exchange
Rules, 83 HARV. L. REV. 825 (1970); Rediker, Civil Liability of Broker-Dealers Under
SEC and NASD Suitability Rules, 22 ALA. L. REV. 15 (1969); Mundheim, Professional
Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445
(1965); Allen, Liability under the Securities Exchange Act for Violations of Stock
Exchange Rules, 25 Bus. L. 1493 (1970).
225. Section 2 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1971).
226. 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1971).
227. 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1971).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1971).
229. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1971).
230. 52 Stat. 1070 (June 25, 1938).
231. Section 15A(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(8) (1971).
232. Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737
(1944). For a Seventh Circuit case on this subject, see Butterman v. Walston & Co.,
387 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968) (opinion by Judge
Kiley joined by Judges Swygert and Fairchild).
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change or of a securities association could be civilly liable for a failure
to abide by a securities exchange or association rule. In Colonial
Realty Corporationv. Bache & Co., a Second Circuit case, 233 the plaintiff sued its stockbroker alleging violations by the broker of the constitution of the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and of the bylaws and Rules of Fair Practice of the NASD in connection with the
broker's liquidation of plaintiff's margin account when the market
value of the stocks in the account declined. After reviewing the rationales for implying private rights of action where none is expressly
granted by statute and the nature of stock exchange and securities
association rules, the court concluded that whether a private action
will lie for violation of an exchange or association rule depends upon
the particular rule involved
with the party urging the implication of a federal liability carrying a considerably heavier burden of persuasion than when the
violation is of the statute or an SEC regulation. The case for
implication would be strongest when
23 4 the rule imposes an explicit
duty unknown to the common law.
It added that some rules are directed at "merely unethical behavior
which Congress could well not have intended to give rise to a legal
claim,"23' 5 and that exclusive federal jurisdiction of such actions under
Section 27,236 predicated on the provision that federal courts alone have
jurisdiction of all suits "to enforce any liability or duty created by
. . . the rules and regulations" under the 1934 Act, would deprive
states of the power to adjudicate such disputes. The court affirmed
the decision below dismissing the complaint on the ground that the
particular provisions on which the plaintiff relied were not within the
class of securities exchange or association rules for which federal civil
actions lie.23 7 Colonial Realty v. Bache has been read as laying the
groundwork for the implication of such causes of action in appropriate circumstances.23 8
The Seventh Circuit was first faced with the question of the implication of a private right of action for the violation of an exchange
rule in Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 239 The
358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966), af'g CCH
91,351 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) [1961-1964 Transfer Binder].
234. 358 F.2d at 182.
233.

FED. SEC. L. REP.

235. 358 F.2d at 182.
236. Supra note 60.

237. 358 F.2d at 183.
238. Buttrey, supra note 109 and text accompanying notes 238-47, infra; Comment,
supra note 240, 83 HARV. L. REV. at 830 n.35.

239. See text accompanying notes 109 supra et seq.

One commentator hasstated
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defendant was alleged to have violated NYSE Rule 405,24 0 the so-called
Know Your Customer Rule, in permitting Michael Dobich, a broker
who defrauded his own customers, to open and maintain an account
in the name of Dobich's firm at Merrill Lynch without giving Merrill
Lynch any financial statements or references and to change the account
from a cash account to a margin account without any investigation of
the Dobich firm's financial ability.2 4 ' The District Court held that
plaintiff had stated a federal claim for the violation of Rule 405.242
After discussing Colonial Realty v. Bache and private rights of action
under the federal securities laws, the Court of Appeals held:
There is nothing inconsistent with [Section 27 of the 1934
Act] in holding that violations of Rule 405 may be actionable as
a "duty created by this chapter" in asmuch as Rule 405 was promulgated in acordance with Sections 6 and 19 of the Act, even if
Rule 405 is not in itself to be considered a rule "thereunder."
See Lowenfels, "Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange
Rules," 66 Colum.L.Rev. 12, 18-19 (1966). The touchstone for
determining whether or not the violation of a particular rule is actionable should properly depend upon its design "for the direct
protection of investors." Id. at 29. Here one of the functions of
Rule 405 is to protect the public, so that permitting a private action for its violation is entirely consistent with the purposes of the
statute.
We do not decide that an alleged violation of Rule 405 is
per se actionable ...
Although mere errors of judgment by defendant might not
support a federal cause of action, the facts alleged here are tanthat Buttrey was the first case where "liability for a violation of the exchange rules
was definitely established." Allen, supra note 224, 25 Bus. L. at 1498.
240. Rule 405 at issue in Buttrey provided:
Every member organization is required through a general partner or an
officer who is a holder of voting stock to
(1) Use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer, every order, every cash or margin account accepted or carried by such
organization and every person holding power of attorney over any account
accepted or carried by such organization.
(2) Supervise diligently all accounts handled by registered representatives of the organization.
(3) Specifically approve the opening of an account prior to or promptly
after the completion ot any transaction for the account of or with a customer,
provided, however, that in the case of branch offices, the opening of an account for a customer may be approved by the manager of such branch office
but the action of such branch office manager shall within a reasonable time be
approved by a general partner or an officer who is a holder of voting stock in
the organization. The member, general partner or officer approving the opening of the account shall, prior to giving his approval, be personally informed
as to the essential facts relative to the customer and to the nature of the
proposed account and shall indicate his approval in writing on a document
which is a part of the permanent records of his. office or organization.
241. 410 F.2d at 141.
242. Unreported Decision (S.D. Ind.) (Judge Noland).
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tamount to fraud on the bankrupt's
customers, thus giving rise
24
to a private civil damage action. 3
The court thus accepted the distinction made by some commentators between rules promulgated for the protection of investors and
mere housekeeping rules. 24 4 Housekeeping rules include regulations
pertaining to trading hours, clearing procedures and other essentially
operational matters. Some writers have accepted that distinction,
but have subdivided the class of rules for the protection of investors
into those which merely prohibit unethical practices and those designed to establish a legal duty, recommending denying civil liability
under the first sub-class and permitting it under the second, where
1 5 This latter distinction
other requisites of civil liability are present.24
2 "6
was suggested in ColonialRealty.
A second major theme developed in the Seventh Circuit's Buttrey
decision rests on its statement that "the facts here are tantamount to
fraud

.

.

." and that "mere errors of judgment

.

.

.

might not support

a federal cause of action."2 47 This suggests that the element of scienter (including reckless conduct) might be required to establish liability, although the decision was far from explicit on this point.
In Avern Trust v. Clarke,24 s a 1969 case, plaintiff had alleged
claims under the federal securities laws including liability for violations of certain NASD rules. In affirming the District Court's dismissal of the latter claims, and its judgment for defendants after jury
trial on other claims the Seventh Circuit held that while it was error
to have dismissed the claim predicated on a violation of the NASD
suitability rule,249 the error was harmless "because the same theory
was incorporated under the claim for violation of section 15 of the
243. 410 F.2d at 142-143.
244. In addition to the commentator cited in the text accompanying note 243, see
Shipman, supra note 224, 17 W. RES. L. REv. at 988; Comment, supra note 224, 83
HARV. L. REV. at 835-36; Allen, supra note 224, 25 Bus. L. at 1500-01.
245. Shipman, supra note 224, 17 W. REs. L. REV. at 1008; Rediker, supra note
224, 22 ALA. L. REV. at 51, 71; Mundheim, supra note 224, 1965 DUKE L.J. at 468;
Comment, Civil Liability for Violation of NASD Rules: S.E.C. v. First Securities Co.,
121 U. PA. L. REV. 388, 396-97 (1972).
246. See text accompanying notes 234-37 supra.
247. See text accompanying note 243 supra.
248. 415 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 963 (1970) (opinion
by Judge Swygert joined by Judges Kiley and Kerner).
249. Rule 2 of Article III of the NASD RULES OF FAIR PRACTICE:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any
security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the
recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts,
if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to
his financial situation and needs.
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Securities and Exchange Act [sic]. 15 U.S.C. §780."'5o This suggests that the test of culpability of state of mind to establish an actionable violation of an NASD rule is at least that required under Rule
15cl-2 2 51 on which the plaintiff in Avern Trust relied,2 52 which in
turn is similar to Rule l0b-5.25 5 After Buttrey and Avern Trust, the
Seventh Circuit thus seemed to permit private enforcement of a broad
range of stock exchange and NASD rules, but considerable doubt ex2 54
isted regarding the state of mind necessary to support liability.
2 5 did not
First Securities-1
add appreciably to the literature. The
court held:
We have no doubt that the enforcement of Nay's rule regarding
the opening of mail is sufficient without more to constitute a
violation of Rule 27 [by First Securities]. Such violations provide a basis for private damage actions where the rule violated
serves to protect the public. [Citing Avern Trust and Buttrey.]2 5 6

250. 415 F.2d at 1242.
251. 17 C.F.R. 240.15cl-2 (1971).
(a)
The term "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance", as used in section 15(c)(1) of the act is hereby defined to include
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person.
(b)
The term "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or
contrivance", as used in section 15(c) (I) of the act, is hereby defined to include any untrue statement of a material fact and any omission to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, which statement or omission is made with knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe that
it is untrue or misleading.
(c) The scope of this section shall not be limited by any specific definitions of the term "manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance" contained in other rules adopted pursuant to section 15 (c) (1) of the
act.
252. 415 F.2d at 1239.
253. See Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 326 F. Supp. 1186, 1189-90
(N.D. Ill. 1970) (Judge Decker), appeal dismissed (7th Cir. 1970), later appeal dismissed, 465 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1972). On the test of culpability under Rule lOb-5,
see text accompanying notes 281 et seq. infra.
254. For district court decisions in this Circuit see The Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
92,748 (N.D. Ill.
1970) [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] (Judge Will) (no private right of action under the
circumstances alleged for a violation of NYSE Rule 405; McMaster Hutchinson and
Co. v. Rothschild and Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
93,541 (N.D. Ill. 1972) [19721973 Transfer Binder] (Judge Bauer) (no private right of action for violation of certain NYSE rules under the circumstances alleged, noting that in Buttrey actual fraud
was alleged, and stating that the discussion of private actions for violation of exchange
rules in Buttrey was dicta.
93,541, at p. 92,585 n.1).
255. Supra note 98.
256. 463 F.2d at 988. NASD Rule 27 provides:
Written procedures
(a)
Each member shall establish, maintain and enforce written procedures which will enable it to supervise properly the activities of each registered
representative and associated person to assure compliance with applicable securities laws, rules, regulations and statements of policy promulgated there-
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FirstSecurities-IH5 7 did not expand upon that statement.
The result in the First Securities litigation seems correct on either

approach to civil liability for a violation of stock exchange or securities association rules.258 Rule 27 is more than a housekeeping rule
and is designed for the protection of investors, thus satisfying the Buttrey test. It also creates explicit duties beyond those recognized at com-

mon law and is more than an ethical precept, thus satisfying the
Colonial Realty test. The court's silence on the state of mind issue
adds little since Nay's fraud was apparently believed by the court to be
that of First Securities as well.25 9
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS UNDER RULE lOb-5

The only affirmative defense which the Seventh Circuit considered during the period covered by this article was the statute of limitations applicable to actions under Rule 1Ob-5 and Section 17 of the
1933 Act.260
under and with the rules of this Association.
Responsibility of member
(b) Final responsibility for proper supervision shall rest with the member. The member shall designate a partner, officer or manager in each office
of supervisory jurisd.ction, including the main office, to carry out the written
supervisory procedures. A copy of such procedures shall be kept in each
such office.
Written approval
(c) Each member shall be responsible for keeping and preserving appropriate records for carrying out the member's supervisory procedures. Each
member shall review and endorse in writing, on an internal record, all transactions and all correspondence of its registered representatives pertaining to the
solicitation or execution of any securities transaction.
Review of activities and annual inspection
(d) Each member shall review the activities of each office, which shall
include the periodic examination of customer accounts to detect and prevent
irregularities or abuses and at least an annual inspection of each office of
supervisory jurisdiction.
Qualificationsinvestigated
(e) Each member shall have the responsibil'ty and duty to ascertain by
investigation the good character, business repute, qualifications and experience
of any person prior to making such a certification in the application of such
person for registration with this Association.
"Office of supervisory jurisdiction"
(f) "Office of supervisory jurisdiction" means any office designated as
directly responsible for the review of the activities of registered representatives
or associated persons in such off ce and/or in other offices of the member.
257. Supra note 119.
258. See text accompanying notes 244-46, supra.
259. One recent commentator has found the Seventh Circuit's opinions too simplistic,
especially when compared to the Second Circuit's somewhat more refined approach in
Colonial Realty. Comment, Civil Liability for Violation of NASD Rules: SEC v.
First Securities Co., 121 U. PA. L. REV. 388 (1972).
260. See generally: Schulman, Statutes of Limitation in lOb-5 Actions: Complications Added to Confusion, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 635 (1967). This Article will not
consider problems posed by borrowing statutes; Ruder and Cross, Limitations in
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Since Congress did not provide a statute of limitations applicable
to private actions under Rule
have selected the appropriate
statutes of the forum state. 26 2
state statute of limitations to

10b-5 or Section 17,261 federal courts
statute of limitations from the various
The problem is that of deciding which
choose. In Parrent v. Midwest Rug

Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1125, 1144 (1972). Many courts
have considered these problems. E.g.: First Circuit: Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d
781 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965) (Massachusetts general two
year period); Dyer v. E. Trust and Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890 (D. Me. 1971)
(Maine blue sky law two year period). Second Circuit: Klein v. Auchincloss, Parker
& Redpath, 436 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1971) (New York six year fraud statute of limitations). Third Circuit: Tobacco and Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 244 F.2d
902 (3d Cir. 1957) (Delaware three year fraud statute). Fourth Circuit: Batchelor
v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D. 553 (D. Md. 1971) (Maryland two year blue sky statute of
limitations). Fifth Circuit: Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1967)
(suggesting that the fraud statute of limitations applies); Aboussie v. Aboussie, 441
F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1971) (the parties agreed that the two year Texas fraud statute of
limitations applies); Richardson v. Salinas, 336 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Tex. 1972) (Texas
three year blue sky law); Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King Int'l, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 799
(M.D. Fla. 1972) (Florida three year fraud statute of limitations); Josef's of Palm
Beach, Inc. v. Southern Investment Co., 349 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (Florida
two year blue sky statute of limitations); Lamb v. United Security Life Co., 59 F.R.D.
44 (S.D. Ia. 1973) (Alabama one year general statute of limitations; Alabama was the
state in which the action was originally filed). Sixth Circuit: Charney v. Thomas,
372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967) (Michigan six year fraud statute of limitations); Denny v.
93,387 (M.D. Tenn. 1971)
Performance Systems, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. RE'.
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] (Tennessee ten year catch all statute of limitations).
Eighth Circuit: Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 852 (1970) (Arkansas two year blue sky law). Ninth Circuit: Douglass v.
Glenn E. Hinton Investments, Inc., 440 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1972) (Washington three
year fraud statute of limitations). United California Bank v. Salik, CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP.
94,023 (9th Cir. 1973) [Current Binder], pet. for cert. filed, Docket 73-331.
(California three year fraud statute of limitations). Tenth Circuit: deHaas v. Empire
Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970) (the parties agreed that the Colorado
three year fraud statute of limitations applied.); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) (Utah three year
fraud statute of limitations applied). There is, however, apparently some disagreement among all judges of the Tenth Circuit court of appeals. See Financial Indus.
Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 516 (10th Cir. 1973) (en
D.C. Cir.: Conlon v. Univ. Combanc) cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3199 (1973).
puting Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 93,796 (D.D.C. 1973) [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] (District of Columbia three year fraud statute of limitations).
261. Some commentators suggest that no private right of action should exist under
Rule lOb-5 because Congress did not expressly provide such an action. E.g., Ruder,
Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent, 57 Nw.
U.L. REV. 627 (1963).
Others suggest that no private right of action should exist
to enforce Section 17(a). See 3 Loss, SEcunrrms REoULAroNr 1784-87 (2d ed. 1961).
At least one court has agreed with Professor Loss (Dyer v. E. Trust and Banking Co.,
336 F. Supp. 890, 903-05 (D. Me. 1971)), but other courts have entertained such
actions. E.g., Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089, 1093-96 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (limited remedy under Section 17). The Seventh Circuit has not decided the
Section 17(a) question.
262. The rationale is set forth in Int'l UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S.
696 (1966).
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Mills, Inc.2 68 the Seventh Circuit adopted a "resemblance" test, holding
that the state limitations statute selected should be that which "best
effectuates" the federal policy behind Section 10(b).2 64 The choice
facing the court in Parrent, which had been filed in the Northern

District of illinois, was between the Illinois statute of limitations
which applies to common law fraud suits2"' and the statute of limitations in the Illinois Securities Law of 1953.206 Prior to its Parrent

decision the Seventh Circuit appeared to have selected the Illinois fraud
statute.2 67 In Charney v. Thomas,268 the first case utilizing a resemblance test, the Sixth Circuit chose the statute of limitations applicable

to fraud suits in Michigan noting that the Michigan securities
not contain a statute similar to Rule 10b-5 and that common
enter would probably be required in a Rule 10b-5 action.
other hand, in Vanderboom v. Sexton 269 the Eighth Circuit

law did
law sciOn the
applied

the statute of limitations in the Arkansas Securities Act holding that
the civil liability provisions of that statute more closely resemble Rule

10b-5, since in the Eighth Circuit a plaintiff can recover for negligent
as weli as intentional violations of the Rule.27 In Parrent the Seventh
Circuit followed Vanderboom and applied the three year period in the
263. 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972) (opinion by Judge Kiley joined by Judge Pell;
Judge Stevens concurred in the judgment).
264. Id. at 125.
265. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 16 (five years).
266. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121%, § 137.13.A and 13.B.
A. Every sale of a security made in violation of the provisions of this
Act shall be voidable at the election of the purchaser exercised as provided in
subsection B of this Section; and upon tender to the seller or into court of the
securities sold or, where the securities were not received, of any contract
made in respect of such sale, the issuer, controlling person, underwriter, dealer
or other person by or on behalf of whom said sale was made, and each underwriter, dealer or salesman who shall have participated or aided in any way in
making such sale, and in case such issuer, controlling person, underwriter or
dealer is a corporation or unincorporated association or organization, each
of its officers and directors (or persons performing similar functions) who
shall have participated or aided in making such sale, shall be jointly and
severally liable to such purchaser for (1) the full amount paid, together with
interest from the date of payment for the securities sold at the rate of the
interest or dividend stipulated in the securities sold (or if no rate is stipulated,
then at the legal rate of interest) less any income or other amounts received
by such purchaser on such securities and (2) the reasonable fees of such purchaser's attorney incurred in any action brought for recovery of the amounts
recoverable hereunder.
B. Notice of any election provided for in subsection A of this Section
shall be given by the purchaser, within 6 months after the purchaser shall
have knowledge that the sale of the securities to him is voidable, to each person from whom recovery will be sought, by registered letter addressed to the
person to be notified at his last known address with proper postage affixed,
or by personal service ....
267. Butterman v. Steiner, 343 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1965).
268. 372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967).
269. 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1970).
270. 422 F.2d at 1238-39. See text accompanying notes 281 infra et seq.
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Illinois Securities Law,27 stating that these provisions cover "the same
violations as Rule lOb-5.' 72
Although the three year period chosen for Illinois has the advantage of being similar in length to the limitation period applicable
to the express liability provisions of the federal securities laws,273 the
selection of a three year period was in large part fortuitous. Under the
resemblance test, the Illinois Securities Law provision would have
7
2
been chosen even if it contained a four year or two year period.

1

Under the resemblance test the statute of limitations applicable to actions under Rule 1Ob-5 may vary from one year to at least ten years,
depending upon the forum. 273

The period may change even within a

federal district if the court changes its approach regarding the elements of an action under Rule 1Ob-5. r0
271. 455 F.2d at 126. A district court subsequently held that the provision of the
Illinois Securities Law that the purchaser must make a demand on the seller within six
months of obtaining knowledge that the sale is voidable (Section 13.B) does not apply
in an action under Rule lob-5. Guarantee Ins. Agency Co. v. Mid-Continental Realty
Corp., 57 F.R.D. 555, 562 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (Judge McLaren).
272. 455 F.2d at 127. See also text accompanying notes 281 infra et seq.
273. Section 13 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1971) and Sections 9(e) and
18(c) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e) and 78r(c), respectively, all have three year
maximums.
274. The length of the statutes of limitation under consideration may cause a
court to refuse the resemblance test. For example, in United California Bank v.
Salik, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
94,023 (9th Cir. 1973) [Current Binder], pet. for
cert. filed, Docket 73-331, the choice in a case brought in California was between a one
year after discovery blue sky statute and a three year fraud statute. Even though the
Ninth Circuit appears to apply a negligence test in Rule lOb-5 actions (Ellis v.
Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961) ), the court chose the longer fraud statute
of limitations ruling that "the broad remedial policies of the federal securities laws are
best served by a longer, not shorter, statute of limitations." 1 94,023, at 94,113 (footnotes omitted).
275. Supra note 260. In addition, the federal tolling rule, which stays the running
of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff should have discovered the violation, applies to all Rule lOb-5 actions. Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 348 (1874) and Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946), cited in Parrent, 455 F.2d at 128.
276. For example, in Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1969) (opinion by
Judge Cummings, joined by Judges Kiley and Fairchild) the court appeared to accept
the application of the Indiana six year fraud statute of limitations (Burns Ind. Stat.
§ 2-601) and in Butterman v. Steiner, 343 -F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1965) (opinion by
Judge Knoch, joined by Judges Castle and Kiley) the court appeared to accept the
application of the Lllino~s five year fraud statute of limitations, supra note 265, since in
both cases the court affirmed decisions by district courts which had applied their
respective statutes of limitation. The court distinguished those cases in Parrent, stating,
"On appeal, however, no party in either case challenged the district court choices."
455 F.2d at 125 n.4. Nevertheless, the fraud statute of limitations was applied on the
authority of those cases. Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, supra note
253, 326 F. Supp. at 1189. One reason the court in Salik, supra note 274, did not follow the blue sky statute of limitations was that it would result in a change in the rule
of law relied upon by private parties.
94,023, at 94,113, quoting Douglass v. Glenn
E. Hinton Investments, Inc., supra note 260, 440 F.2d at 916.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

Given the wide latitude accorded plaintiffs in selecting a forum
in actions under Rule lOb-5, 2 7 the present approach to Rule lOb-5
statutes of limitation leads to wholesale forum shopping. It is no wonder, then, that much securities litigation gravitates to the Southern District of New York with its six year statute of limitations.27
The express civil liability provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts
have a maximum three year statute of limitations.2" 9 The logical,
orderly resolution of the long-standing problems pertaining to the determination of the statute of limitations in actions under Rule 1Ob-5
is to apply the federal three year period and to apply it nationwide."
THE STANDARD OF CULPABILITY

Parrent was not the only recent opinion to deal with the issue of
the standard of culpability in actions under Rule lOb-5. 28 1 At least
implicitly the court there accepted a negligence standard, by noting
its agreement with the principles stated in Vanderboom v. Sexton.2" 2
2 83 first cited
The court in Dasho-11
the prior Seventh Circuit
statement that "[t]he 'scienter' required in common law fraud is not necessary"2 8 4 and noted that the Second Circuit has held that "lack of
diligence, constructive fraud, or unreasonable or negligent conduct" is
sufficient to establish liability under Rule 10b-5. 2s 5 It also concluded

277. Section 27 of the 1934 Act, supra note 60.
278. Klein v. Auchincloss, Parker & Redpath, supra note 260.
279. Supra note 273.
280. For a more detailed p~esentation of this position, see Ruder and Cross,
Limitations on Civil Liability under Rule 10b-5, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1125, 1147-50 (1972).
Since Parrent it has been held that the statute of limitations applicable to a Rule
10b-5 action brought in Wisconsin is the.one year period in the blue sky law, § 551.59.
Kramer v. Loewi & Co., 357 F. Supp. 83 (E.D. Wisc. 1973). In Corey v. Bache &
Co., 355 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.W. Va. 1973), a transferee court from the Southern District of Indiana applied the Indiana two year blue sky statute of limitations, § 25-873e.
281. Supra note 62.
282. Parrent, supra, note 263, 455 F.2d at 126.
283. Supra note 151.
284. 461 F.2d at 29, n.51, quoting Kohler v. Kohler Co., supra note 3, 319 F.2d at
637.
285. 461 F.2d at 29 n.51, quoting S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
854-55 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
However, Texas Gulf
Sulphur involved an S.E.C. suit for an injunction and the burden of proof placed on the
S.E.C. in such actions is not as great as that which must be discharged by a private
litigant seeking damages. See text accompanying note 149 supra. In private Rule lOb-5
damage actions the Second Circuit is generally conservative; while intent to defraud is
not necessary, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth is required.
Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971). See ChrisCraft Industries, Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3227 (1973); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1301-02
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that the same requirements apply to actions under Section 14(a).286
The court then held that "To the extent that intent is relevant, the evidence is adequate" to support a remand.2" 7 There was no reference to
Dasho-ll in the passing discussion of the culpability requirement in
Parrent.
In Swanson-I, Judge Sprecher stated in dissent, citing Parrent,
that scienter is not an element of proof in actions under Rule 1Ob-5.2 s 8
While he did not define scienter, it is clear from his opinion that, as
he reads Rule 1Ob-5, a plaintiff at least need not prove intent to in28 9
jure, and scienter may mean only lack of good faith.
It is thus apparent that while the Seventh Circuit has made statements which could cause it to be viewed as a liberal court on the

question of culpability in actions under Rule lOb-5,
veloped a consistent approach to the issue.
seems essential.
SECTION

16 (b)

9°

it has not de-

Greater clarity in this area

OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT

Within the period covered by this article the court rendered
one opinion under Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act.29 ' In broad
(2d Cir. 1973). But see Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d at 1319 Judge Hays, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
286. 461 F.2d at 29-30 n.51, citing Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive
Designers, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 910, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), afI'd, 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir.
1970); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd
[after Dasho-I1], 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973). However, two courts have held that
the culpability requirement under Section 14(a) can be less than required under Rule
lOb-5. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d at 1300-01 (2d Cir. 1973); Gould
v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 861-63 (D. Del. 1972).
287. 461 F.2d at 29.
288. Swanson-II, supra note 152, 475 F.2d at 525.
289. 475 F.2d at 525. Judge Sprecher states that the burden of proof on state of
mind should be lighter in a private action than in an action brought by the SEC.
That is contrary to the prevailing rule that the burden in SEC injunctive suits is less
than in a private suit for damages. See text accompanying note 149 supra.
290. See Bucklo, supra note 63, 67 Nw. U.L. REv.at 584-87 and notes.
291. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1971). Section 16(a) and (b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) and
(b), provides:
(a) Every person who isdirectly or indirectly the beneficial owner of
more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an
exempted security) which is registered pursuant to section 12 of this title, or
who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the
time of the registration of such security on a national securities exchange or
by the effective date of a registration statement filed pursuant to section 12(g)
of this title, or within ten days after he becomes such beneficial owner, director, or officer, a statement with the Commission (and, if such security is
registered on a national securities exchange, also with the exchange) of the
amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial
owner, and within ten days after the close of each calendar month thereafter,
if there has been a change in such ownership during such month, shall fle with
the Commission (and if such security is registered on a national securities
exchange, shall also file with the exchange), a statement indicating his own-
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terms, Section 16(b) provides that any profit obtained by an officer,
director or 10% stockholder of a corporation on a purchase and sale
or sale and purchase of the corporation's stock within six months
is recoverable by the corporation, irrespective of whether the person
possessed or used inside information. That provision has often been
mechanically applied, requiring "innocent" persons to disgorge profits
in order to snare those who misuse inside information.2" 2 However,
in recent years the United States Supreme Court has limited the applica-

tion of Section 16(b) in some situations.

3

Brenner v. Career Academy, Inc. 294 was a derivative suit brought
against an officer and director of Career Academy, Inc. ("Career"),
Fred Johnson. Johnson owned 35,528 shares of Career. He sold 20,000
of those shares in a registered public offering which became effective
on September 28, 1967, which was also the date of execution of the
underwriting agreement pursuant to which Johnson sold the shares
to the underwriters for public resale. In October of 1967 Johnson
ership at the close of the calendar month and such changes in his ownership
as have occurred during such calendar month.
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which
(b)
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by
reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any
purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such
issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less than six
months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a
debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer,
irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or
officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of
not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit
to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the
issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse
to bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to
prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than
two years after the date such profit was realized. This subsection shall not
be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not
such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of
the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the
purpose of this subsection.
292. Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 344-45 (6th Cir. 1958); Smolowe v.
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 1943); Feder v. Martin-Marietta Corp.,
406 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 1969).
293. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972) (four to
three decision, with two justices not participating) (where 10% stockholder reduces its
holdings below 10% by a sale, remaining sales even within six months of the purchase
are not within the scope of Section 16(b) since the seller is no longer a 10% stockholder at the time of the later sales); Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 93 S. Ct. 1736 (1973) (six to three decision) (sales by unsuccessful tenderofferor even where it became 10% stockholder are not within the intended scope of
section 16(b)).
294. 467 F.2d 1080 (7th Cir. 1972) (opinion by Senior Judge Durfee of the
Court of Claims joined by Senior Judge Duffee and by Judge Eschbach of the Northern
District of Indiana).
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purchased 6,000 shares of Career pursuant to the exercise of non-

transferable, qualified stock options previously granted by Career.
Plaintiff argued that the September sale and October purchase should
be matched and any profit returned to Career. The District Court
agreed. -95
On appeal defendant contended that the exercise of the stock option constituted the conversion of an equity security and thus under
Rule 16b-9 296 was not a purchase. However, the Seventh Circuit
held that Rule 16b-9 cannot be construed to exclude the exercise of a

stock option from Section 16(b).

It held that since a former version

of Rule 16b-3,29 7 which specifically exempted from Section 16(b) the
acquisition of stock pursuant to the exercise of a restricted stock opinion, had been held to be in conflict with Section 16 (b) and therefore invalid, 29 8 any interpretation of Rule 16b-9 which would exempt the
acquisition of stock pursuant to an option would likewise be invalid.
Furthermore, the SEC had stated that Rule 16b-9 does not apply to

such transactions.299
The remaining question was the amount of profit to be recovered
by Career. Johnson exercised the options at a price of $6.585 per
share and sold the stock in the public offering at $49.25 per share. °
295. 328 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. Wisc. 1971) (Chief Judge Tehan).
296. 17 C.F.R. 240.16b-9 (1971)
(a) Any acquisition or disposition of an equity security involved in the
conversion of an equity security which, by its terms or pursuant to the terms
of the corporate charter or other governing instruments, is convertible immediately or after a stated period of time into another equity security of the
same issuer, shall be exempt from the operation of section 16(b) of the Act:
Provided, however, That this section shall not apply to the extent that there
shall have been either (1) a purchase of any equity security of the class convertible (including any acquisition of or change in a conversion privilege)
and a sale of any equity security of the class issuable upon conversion, or
(2) a sale of any equity security of the class convertible and any purchase of
any equity security issuable upon conversion (otherwise than in a transaction
involved in such conversion or in a transaction exempted by any other rule
under section 16(b) ) within a period of less than 6 months which includes
the date of conversion.
(b) For the purpose of this section, an equity security shall not be
deemed to be acquired or disposed of upon conversion of an equity security if
the terms of the equity security converted require the payment or entail the
receipt, in connection with such conversion, of cash or other property
(other than equity securities involved in the conversion) equal in value at the
time of conversion to more than 15 percent of the value of the equity security issued upon conversion.
(c)
For the purpose of this section, an equity security shall be
deemed convertible if it is convertible at the option of the holder or of some
other person or by operation of the terms of the security or the governing instruments.
297. SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT REL. 5312 (1956).
298. Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
299. SECURITIES Ex. ACT REL. 7826 (1966).
300. 328 F. Supp. at 150.
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Although simple mathematics might have suggested recovery based
on 6,000 shares times a profit per share of $42.665, or $255,990, the
Seventh Circuit was faced with complications caused by the use of options, and thus had a choice of $33,750 or $48,750.301 Where the
purchase at issue results from the exercise of an option, Rule 16b6(b) limits the recovery under Section 16(b) to the difference between
the proceeds of sale and the lowest market price of any security of the
same class within six months before or after the date of sale.3 02 Since
the market price of Career stock in recent months had exceeded the
option exercise price, the exercise price could not be used to determine
the recoverable profits. The Seventh Circuit thus had to determine on
what date the defendant sold his stock and then determine the lowest
market price within six months before and after that date.
The plaintiff contended the date of sale was the date of execution
of the underwriting agreement; the defendant contended it was the
date of transfer of title. The parties accepted each other's computations predicated upon the two dates.30 3 The Court of Appeals agreed
with the defendant, thereby finding recoverable profits of $33,750.304
The court found it
anomalous to hold that the rights and obligations of the parties
became fixed at the time of the underwriting agreement and yet
to hold that at the same time the sale pursuant to the underwriting
agreement was part of a transaction proscribed by Section 16(b)
of the 1934 Act. 305 .
Since the underwriting agreement was a binding contract, any profit
to be made was assured at the time of execution, and seems that it
would be on that date, not the date of transfer of title, that any abuse
301. 467 F.2d at 1082, 1084.
302. 17 C.F.R. 240.16b-6(b) (1971). Rule lOb-6(a) and -6(b) provide:
(a)
To the extent specified in paragraph (b) of this section the Commission hereby exempts as not comprehended within the purposes of section

16(b) of the act any transaction or transactions involving the purchase of

any equity security where such purchase is pursuant to the exercise of an op-

tion or similar right either (1) acquired more than six months before its exercise, or (2) acquired pursuant to the terms of an employment contract entered into more than six months before its exercise.
(b)
In respect of transactions specified in paragraph (a) of this section the profits inuring to the issuer shall not exceed the difference between
the proceeds of sale and the lowest market price of any security of the same
class within six months before or after the date of sale. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to enlarge the amount of profit which would inure to
the issuer in the absence of this section.
303. 328 F. Supp. at 153 n.1. The district court's opinion on damages was a
Supplemental Opinion rendered on June 15, 1971. It does not appear in the report of
the decision at CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,215 [1971-1972 Transfer Binder].
304. 467 F.2d at 1084-85.
305. 467 F.2d at 1084.
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The court predicated
of inside information would have occurred.30°
its argument in part on Rule 16b-6 which focuses on the "proceeds of sale," thereby "contemplat[ing] that the date which serves
as the measuring date be accompanied by a receipt of proceeds." '
The defendant's argument, rejected before the District Court, was
that various conditions in the underwriting agreement might have operated to release the parties thereto from their obligations, and until
the completion of the closing without such conditions occurring there
was no sale. 0 " The Court of Appeals' reasons for finding in favor of
the defendant on this issue remain unclear.
One portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion militates more toward the plaintiff's position as to the date of sale than the defendant's:
[1]t would be a distortion of the purpose of the Act to permit an
insider to avoid liability altogether under 16(b) through the simple expedient of delaying the time of payment beyond the proscribed period while entering into a contract within the proscribed
period which
fixed the purchase price to be received for these
09
shares A
The court did not face the apparent inconsistency created by prohibiting a seller from manipulating a transaction to avoid liability altogether
while allowing him to manipulate the date of sale in order to reduce
the profits recoverable in the option situation.
CONCLUSION

As noted at the outset, in recent months the Court of Appeals
306. See, e.g., Champion Home Builders Co. v. Jeffress, 352 F. Supp. 1081,
1083 (E.D. Mich. 1973) ("The date of purchase or sale under which a person acquires

'beneficial ownership' of stock under § 16(b) . .. is not the date of transfer of the
stock but the date on which the parties are irrevocably bound.") and cases cited therein.
Brenner is also inconsistent with the approach taken by the court in Bershad v.
McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971) (opinion
by Judge Cummings joined by Chief Judge Swygert and by Chief Judge Grant of the

Nothern District of Indiana), where the court held that the date of sale of the stock
was the date of sale of an option on the stock, even though the exercise of the option

did not occur until later, since the size of the option price was "a significant deterrent
to the abandonment of the contemplated sale," 428 F.2d at 698.

Pertinent to Brenner,

the court stated:
The insider should not be permitted to speculate with impunity merely by
varying the paper form of his transactions. The commercial substance of the

transaction rather than its form must be considered, and courts should guard
against sham transactions by which an insider disguises the effective transfer
of stock. 428 F.2d at 697.
While there was no attempt to disguise the transaction in Brenner, it seems there was
an effort to interpret Rule 16b-6 in a way which minimized the recoverable profits
rather than maximized them by elevating form over "commercial substance."
307. 467 F.2d at 1085.
308. 328 F. Supp. at 153.
309. 467 F.2d at 1085 (footnote omitted).
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has continued to make significant contributions to case law under the
federal securities laws. If the court has a recurrent shortcoming in this
area it is that opinions on a particular issue frequently take no explicit
notice of recent opinions by the court on the same subject, a practice
often resulting in a lack of consistent positions within the court.
Sennott made no reference to First Securities-I, let alone to Brennan
or Buttrey. Jannes made no reference -to Dasho-II, or to Dasho-I.
Parrent made no reference to Dasho-II. Brenner made only passing
reference to Bershad v. McDonough. 1 ° As securities cases continue to
increase the problem may be aggravated. It may not be reasonable to
expect every opinion to review decisions in point in the other ten circuits, but it is not expecting too much to ask for continuity among
opinions by the same court-or explicit disagreement, if that be
the case.
310. Supra note 306.

